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In this thesis, I promote the relevance of time to International Relations theory, arguing 
that the meaning and character of time often taken as given or natural is actually the 
result of material, historical, and sociopolitical processes, and that ignoring these 
processes effectively prolongs and empowers them. I develop these themes in the 
following ways. First, utilizing a temporal lens from social theory, I briefly typologize the 
theoretical canon. Second, I employ a genealogical history to uncover the coeval rises of 
Western standard time and territorial state sovereignty. Third, I argue that the dominance 
of abstract, Western temporality continues virtually unchallenged, implicating IR 
scholarship in the reproduction of that hegemony. Finally, I address theoretical 
developments that have the potential to contribute to a greater understanding of time’s 
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Introduction and temporalized literature review 
 
 
Very much more do we value the distinct, the geometric, the universal . . . To the . . . obsession of 
Time, with its emotional urgency and visceral agitation, we prefer [the] ‘obsession of Space’. 
 —Wyndham Lewis 
 
This is the time. Now is the place. 





 To date, theories of international relations have little space for time. While 
enjoying extensive treatment in other disciplines including philosophy, social theory, and 
political theory, the study of time has received short shrift from International Relations 
(IR)2 scholars. However, time is a crucial component of world politics. Ultimatums 
(temporal deadlines) mark and sometimes hurry the onset of violent conflicts, quick 
victories in those conflicts equate to greater power, and the historical taxonomy of wars 
                                                 
1 Kennedy’s comment was made while introducing an immigration bill on 2 July 2007 (Smith 
2007). 
2 By convention, I use capitals and the acronym to denote the academic discipline of International 
Relations while referring to the political phenomena that occur between or across nation-states as 
international relations. 
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frequently characterizes them by their duration.3 International institutions and regimes 
emerge over years, decades, or centuries rather than appearing instantaneously in the 
global milieu. Innovations such as telegraphs, telephones, televisions, and the internet 
have induced a diplomatic upheaval in the past two centuries, compressing timeframes in 
which negotiations and decisions take place from months or weeks to hours and 
sometimes minutes. Some political research employs time-series analyses or implies 
temporality by discussing long cycles in historico-political developments. This list, while 
no means comprehensive, is demonstrative of the implicit nature of time in the study of 
international relations: time functions as context or as analytical indicator, but not as a 
distinct component deserving judicious investigation. 
 This research project has two primary purposes. First, I promote the relevance of 
time to international relations and IR theory by demonstrating that an explicit discussion 
about temporality can aid in our understanding of world politics. Second, I argue that the 
meaning and character of time often taken as given or natural is actually the result of 
material, historical, and sociopolitical processes, and that ignoring these processes 
effectively prolongs and empowers them. These objectives are pursued in three ways. In 
this chapter, I develop a temporal lens from social theory and show how it can usefully 
typologize the theoretical canon and facilitate critique. Because my goal is to argue for 
time’s relevance to IR, the literature review that follows does not provide a 
                                                 
3 Some wars have come to be conventionally known by their duration, including the Hundred 
Years’ War (1337-1453), the Nordic Seven Years’ War (1563-1570), the Thirty Years’ War (1618-
1648), and the Six Days’ War (5 June 1967–10 June 1967). 
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comprehensive summary of IR theory.4 Such an endeavor is more suited to the goal of 
demonstrating time’s power in IR theory as a competitor to other modes of analysis such 
as spatial (geopolitical) accounts5 or agent-structure orientations.6 Rather, the stated goal 
demands the exploration of aspects of IR theory that include temporal claims (implicit 
and explicit, negative and positive) and the effects of these claims on theory. In 
methodological parlance, I freely admit to selecting on the dependent variable and argue 
that a straightforward demonstration of the existence of such variables is supportive of 
the contention that temporality needs to be incorporated into IR in a more systematic and 
self-conscious way. 
 In chapter two, I use a genealogical history to demonstrate the contingency of 
time as it is most commonly conceived (consisting of seconds, minutes, hours, days, etc). 
This history is based on the connection between standard time and a coeval7 phenomenon 
of the European Enlightenment: state sovereignty. Such a connection may seem, at first 
glance, to be tantamount to tethering a mole hill to a mountain. But I hope to show that 
this particular method of reckoning time—as the linear progression of rational, consistent, 
                                                 
4 For an excellent and equitable example of a more comprehensive yet thematic review, see 
(Rengger 2000). 
5 See (Herz 1957, 1968). Also see Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, excerpted in (Keohane 
1986), which receives attention in later in this chapter. More recently, see (Ferguson and 
Mansbach 2004, Yiftachel 2005). 
6 Waltz’s Theory of International Politics also features an agent-structure discussion, as does his 
earlier work, (Waltz 1959). For a seminal constructivist account of the agent-structure problem, 
see (Wendt 1999). For a survey of the debate in IR from a scientific realist perspective, see (Wight 
2006). 
7 Coeval in this sense means basic contemporaneity but also implies intersubjectivity, or an 
interaction between two elements sharing the same time (Fabian 1983:30-31). 
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infinitely divisible units measured by a mechanical timepiece and thus divorced from 
their natural (celestial) foundations—is a forgotten product of modernity.8 I characterize 
it as forgotten because acceptance of clock-based time, evidenced by a dearth of 
contestations of the concept, effectively naturalizes an Enlightenment phenomenon 
deserving of much closer scrutiny. Another phenomenon that has received scrutiny is 
territorial state sovereignty, a foundational concept of both the international system and 
IR. Might modern temporality also buttress the international system in important ways? 
Exploring these issues more closely reflects the observation that the arrangement of 
international affairs has both spatial and temporal components. However, this ostensibly 
mundane observation may be more provocative than it initially appears if the 
proliferation of geopolitics but not chrono- or temporo-politics is any indication.9 
A genealogical account of modern time as a global standard uncovers the 
historical contingency of this particular method of reckoning time. After its birth in 
Western Europe, modern time was globalized, along with territorial sovereignty, via 
colonialism. And much as sovereignty as a spatial organizing principle persisted past 
colonial independence, so did the regime of Western European standardized time. 
Founded in critical social theory,10 genealogical techniques challenge a “logic of 
                                                 
8 I frame the historical era associated with modernity as broadly as possible—from the Protestant 
Reformation to present day—in order to give adequate attention to the germination and 
proliferation of modern temporality.  
9 Although, der Derian has begun to advocate the study of chronopolitics. See (der Derian 1990). 
10 Risking irony, for ‘foundational’ examples, see Foucault’s (1971) exploration of Nietzsche (2003 
[1913]). 
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calculability and an appearance of scientific objectivity that places . . . fundamental 
assumptions . . . beyond discussion and debate” (de Goede 2005:3). Genealogies have been 
used in studies of international politics to historicize such concepts as finance (de Goede 
2005), diplomacy (der Derian 1992), and sovereignty (Bartelson 1995). Inherent in all 
these efforts is the belief that the concepts under investigation have become reified and 
naturalized—that they have come to be viewed as given, timeless, or universal. 
Genealogies are thus a process of rediscovery that challenges the naturalness of such 
social facts, all of which were constituted somewhere and somewhen.11 Given IR’s prior 
inattentiveness, incorporating temporal issues into the discipline without historicizing 
them would further reify the omission of time as a sociopolitical object.12 
In chapter three, I discuss some ways in which this accepted view of time has 
influenced scholarly efforts to comprehend international affairs. I argue that modern 
temporality now exerts an even greater influence on world politics than modern 
                                                 
11 Understanding these elements as ‘social facts’ relies on a constructivist “emphasis on the 
ontological reality of intersubjective knowledge” (Adler 1997:322), which is appropriate given that 
all of the listed elements have no value independent of some agreement between social actors. The 
benefit of this reliance is that it can “illuminate important features of international politics that 
were previously enigmatic and have crucial practical implications for international theory and 
empirical research” (Adler 1997:323). Treatments of sovereignty in IR have often explicitly 
acknowledged its social foundations. For example, see (Weber 1995, Biersteker and Weber 1996, 
Ruggie 1998, Hall 1999, Philpott 2001). Giddens has called explicitly for such a treatment of clock 
time, contending that it “should not be accepted simply as an unquestioned dimension . . . but 
must be regarded as itself a socially conditioned influence upon . . . actors in modern societies” 
(1984:132-33). 
12 A genealogical inclination is even more appropriate to this topic in light of der Derian’s 
discussion of genealogical critiques, based on an understanding of temporal contingency as 
insecurity, as undercutting the promise that security and stability can be accomplished through 
knowledge production (1992:35-38). 
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sovereignty. Current IR research devotes substantial space to arguments regarding the 
demise of the territorial sovereign state. However, the hegemony of abstract, clock-based 
temporality continues virtually unchallenged, implicating IR scholarship in the re-
production of that hegemony. Furthermore, IR has displayed a tendency to accept 
without question a dichotomized view of time as having either a cyclical or linear nature. 
This dichotomy is itself a convention that exerts disciplinary power on the field, treating 
as schizophrenic the few theoretical movements that conceptualize time as neither 
exclusively cyclical nor linear before forcing those movements into an either-or binary 
that limits their theoretical relevance. Thus, IR scholarship loses time in two ways. First, 
it overwhelmingly favors spatial concepts and constructions over temporal ones. Second, 
when it does address time, IR acquiesces to the immutability of what is, in reality, a 
historically conditioned means of dealing with temporality as a concept. IR has always 
used time, albeit blithely, tacitly, or haphazardly, to understand the international realm. 
However, few scholars have critically examined any aspect of time’s usage, and those who 
have adopt the cyclical-linear dichotomy without reflection. Rectifying this error can 
lead to reduced theoretical dissonance within the field, so the chapter closes by proposing 
the corrective metaphor of time as a wheel. 
 I conceive this thesis as an initial effort of a research program committed to the 
methodical and explicit treatment of temporality in IR. In chapter four, I address 
theoretical developments that have the potential to contribute to a greater understanding 
of time’s role in international relations by showing how time is productive of the social 
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subject. These developments are occurring primarily in foreign policy analysis and critical 
studies concerned with self, memory, and trauma. Combining insights from these areas of 
study, I suggest that the next step in taking time more seriously is to depart the privileged 
present that typifies positivist theorizing; by doing so, IR can rediscover its past, 
invigorate its future, and embrace other academic disciplines. 
 
A note on temporal metaphors 
 Before proceeding further, it is necessary to say a few words about the use of 
metaphors in temporal studies. It is virtually impossible to conduct research on time 
without encountering the standard dyad of cyclical and linear time.13 The supremacy of 
this dyad is intriguing given that it coincides with a treatment of time as divisible into 
past, present, and future. Indeed, part of my objective in the rest of this chapter is to 
argue that this binary, especially treated as an Enlightenment either-or dichotomy (Adam 
2004:10), is ill-suited for constructing IR theories. 
 But we need metaphors for that which resists easy explication, and few concepts 
are more resistant than time. In Saint Augustine’s words, “If you do not ask me what time 
is I know, but if you ask me, I do not know” (quoted in Robinson 1920:653).14 But then it 
was also Augustine who rejected the possibility of combining metaphors since time was 
                                                 
13 For example, see (Gould 1987, Price 1996, Morris 1985, Jablonsky 1997). 
14 Augustine’s comment may be the most widely cited in general studies of time, amounting to a 
fortifying “ritual incantation” (Fabian 1983:ix) to which no graduate student should be so brave as 
to refuse recourse. 
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undoubtedly linear in the sense of Christianity’s vision of progression toward the Rapture 
(Lane 2000:241). So it would seem that Kant, who claimed that time is an ontological 
result of the human mind’s need to make intuition explicit (Wight 2006:25), was right. 
We ‘know’ time when we try to explain what we experience. But if we accept Kant, we 
must also remember that the time of the mind always resists discursive efforts (Mooij 
2005:67). 
 Discursive and philosophical issues notwithstanding, time is clearly playing a role 
in international politics, necessitating an engagement with the standard metaphors used 
in its explication. The cyclical conception of time is usually thought to derive from 
nature’s countless “cycles of eternal return”  such as the movement of the planets and 
biological life cycles (Adam 2004:18). Thus, cyclical time is often associated with the 
absence or insignificance of change. The basic linear conception of time claims that there 
are some characteristics distinct to each moment. Time differs depending on how it is 
approached and is thus asymmetric or “anisotropic” (Mooij 2005:228, Adam 2004:32). The 
more seductive vision of linearity sees time as the movement—ever forward—of events 
toward some ultimate goal. This is the linear-progressive time for which Augustine 
argued, the vision with which I will associate all subsequent discussions of linear 
temporality,15 and the reason for one final disclaimer. 
                                                 
15 I base this choice on theoretical preponderance rather than any personal belief in a bright future. 
For a concise history of the varieties of linear and cyclical metaphors, as well as of arguments about 
time in general, see (Mooij 2005). 
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 Subsequent references to ‘progress’ do not refer to merely welcome developments. 
Distinguishing progress as inevitable development from progress as welcome 
developments is important in IR, since few theorists would decry, say, less violence or 
more justice.16 However, I subsequently examine several theorists who insist on a vision 
of time as marking inevitable, irreversible movement toward some endpoint. In this sense, 
‘progress’ may be the caricature of asymmetric time mentioned above—the conflation of 




 The rarity of explicit temporality in IR theory17 necessitates a turn to social theory, 
where time enjoys a more prominent and lucid role. In this section, I begin by 
summarizing substantial efforts to incorporate time in twentieth century social theory. 
                                                 
16 Barkin conflates the two when he tabulates scholars who accept human rights norms 
“uncritically as good ones” as “liberal-idealists” (2003:335 emphasis added). Liberal-idealists should 
be categorized as such because they subscribe to some sort of inevitable, irreversible vision of 
welcome developments, not merely because they view those developments as good or just. 
Holding ‘progressive’ beliefs, in the sense of wanting the world to be better than it currently is, in 
no way necessitates an uncritical acceptance of what counts as ‘better’, and in no way prevents a 
critical examination of betterment in action. For an example, see (Lang 2001). 
17 This could be referred to as the ‘thin’ or ‘short’ argument for the importance of temporal studies 
in IR. I am aware of only five scholars working on international politics topics who have explicitly 
discussed temporality: James der Derian (1990, 1992, 2001), R.B.J. Walker (1991, 1993), Stephen 
Hanson (1997), William Callahan (2006), and Kimberly Hutchings (2007). However, of this quintet, 
only der Derian and Walker have made temporality a recurring feature of their research—the 
other three seem to have come upon time while slaying other dragons. As I discuss in chapter four, 
including related fields such as foreign policy analysis and critical memory studies enlarges this 
group considerably and importantly. 
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Anthony Giddens’ thinking has already been influential in the constructivist movement 
in IR, while the work of G. H. Mead, Eviatar Zerubavel, and Barbara Adam all grant a 
privileged position to time. I conclude by focusing on the work of Patrick Baert, whose 
social theory provides an insightful way to temporally evaluate IR theories. 
 Giddens is best known for introducing structuration theory, which posits that all 
social acts are “recursive”—that their structured properties are “constantly recreated out 
of the very resources which constitute them” (1984:xxiii).18 Structurationism relies on 
“time-space distanciation”, the idea that social interaction persists beyond face-to-face, 
synchronic encounters (Giddens 1984:37). Because the “history” of agents’ continuous 
reflexivity regarding the constraints on and consequences of their many habituated 
actions precedes any future behavior, Giddens views structuration as beginning with 
temporality (1984:3). Temporality also plays an important part in explaining actor intent. 
For Giddens, the greater the temporal duration between an act and its consequence(s), the 
more difficult it becomes to ascribe specific intentionality to the actor. Combined with his 
understanding of consequences as outcomes for which the act(s) were necessary but not 
sufficient (1984:11), Giddens’ intentionality posits a social world in which complexity and 
indeterminacy are positively related to time. 
                                                 
18 Structuration theory has been well-cited in discussions on the relationship between agents and 
structures. For constructivist positions on this discussion, see (Adler 1997:325, Wendt 1992:399, 
and 1999). For a scientific realist account that discusses Giddens, see (Wight 2006). Additionally, 
Giddens is foundational to recent work on the importance of self-identity in state behavior (Steele 
2005, 2007c). 
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 Giddens’ effort to incorporate time as an equal partner to space is meant as an 
antidote to purely structuralist or functionalist accounts of social life. Mead leans further 
toward temporality by devising a social theory based on humans’ experience of the 
present as the locus of reality. For Mead, reality is essentially an overlapping of “specious 
presents” or “emergent events” constituted by the interplay between continuity and 
discontinuity (Maines 2001:42). The idea that the past leads to the present is simply a 
mental construct: “It rests with what we call our mental processes to place these images 
(of the past) in a temporal order. We are engaged in spreading backward what is going on 
so that the steps we are taking will be a continuity in advance to the goals of our conduct” 
(Mead, quoted in Maines 2001:42). This “spreading backward” amounts to a continual 
reconstruction of the past based on the fluid relationship between novelty and 
expectation that characterizes any present (Maines 2001:43). The past remains capable of 
influencing the present and future; Mead’s contribution is to equalize the relationship by 
placing the meaning of each period in perpetual tension with its temporal counterparts. 
In this sense, Meads “philosophy of the present” can be considered a purely temporal 
analog to structurationism. 
 Adam and Zerubavel examine more empirical topics through temporal lenses, 
treating specific uses of time as entry points to general social theorizing. Zerubavel has 
been prolific, generating numerous articles and more than a few books that examine the 
negotiations of calendars (1977, 1982b), the seven-day week (1985), the use of timetables 
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(1976), and collective memory (1996, 2003, 2004).19 The common thread running through 
these works is that human time is not a natural phenomenon but rather is a cultural 
component that structures, and is structured by, daily social life. 
 Adam challenges predominant understandings of social time by criticizing the 
“classical” view of temporal development, which delineates between archaic societies 
(cyclical, presentist) and modern civilizations (linear, past- and future-“extensive”), as an 
oversimplification (2004:75).20 She explores alternate approaches to the study of time 
based on either premodern “creative” acts of tempering, transcendence, knowledge and 
know-how, or the modern “five Cs”: control, compression, colonization, commodification, 
and clock time (2004:124). This framework forms the basis of Adam’s critique of modern 
efforts to abstract and objectify time as independent of lived, human experience. Adam 
also adapts Ulrich Beck’s reflexive modernization, concluding that the temporal principles 
that underpin modern, industrialized society also contain threats to the continued 
cohesiveness of that society (2004:147, see also Beck 1994).21 
 As may be inferred from her five Cs, Adam is highly critical of modern, Western, 
standardized time and its conventional uses. An element of tragedy inheres to modern 
temporal power dynamics: in pursuit of stability and control, the prediction of the future 
produces unintended outcomes that are “lived” in the very locales in which indigenous 
                                                 
19 In addition to those cited in this discussion, see also (Zerubavel 1982a, 1987). 
20 Adam refers to the “classical view” out of a concern to critique the history of scholarship on 
temporality. As mentioned above, I take a similar position with regard to temporal metaphors. 
21 The idea of modernity’s internal temporal tension figures prominently in some of the theorists I 
later refer to as “accelerationist” (see chapter three). 
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time has been usurped by modern, standard time (Adam 2004:124).  This idea in 
particular relates strongly to the colonial phenomena discussed in chapter two, Giddens’ 
time-distanciated outcomes, and Baert’s concern with unintended consequences, to 
which I now turn. 
 
Temporalized Sociology 
 While Adam is likely the preeminent patron of time in social theory,22 Baert 
offers the best opportunity to tease out temporality in IR theory. His framework may be 
less finely parsed than Adam’s nine-celled taxonomy, but it is significant as a direct and 
innovative response to the limiting dichotomy of cyclical versus linear metaphors of time. 
Since that dichotomy disciplines much of the IR canon, Baert’s framework is ideal for a 
canonical evaluation.23 
 Baert’s central concern is how time operates in social theories.24 His “temporalized 
sociology” is based on a denial of “the reality of the abstract moment that is supposed to 
define the knife edge of the present, dividing the frozen past from the labile future” 
(Baert 1992b:viii). This yields a “research program featuring diachronic analysis and 
                                                 
22 Zerubavel’s contributions notwithstanding, Adam has not only published widely on the subject, 
but also founded the journal Time and Society. 
23 Adam’s taxonomy may become more relevant as interest in time in IR grows, although readers 
who find a high degree of theoretical unity in IR may not have use for so many options (four 
creative acts plus the five Cs). I acknowledge Adam’s most subtle construction of social time, but 
now opt for Baert’s conceptual clarity. 
24 Baert characterizes his work as a metatheoretical correction—an attempt to erect a more 
effective theoretical edifice from which to analyze real-world issues (1992b:11). 
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process25 (in the sense of both novelty and continuity) as its methodological rules, as 
opposed to structural synchronic research” (1992b:4). But temporalized sociology is not 
only a methodological assertion: “becoming, process, and diachrony are considered as the 
ontological grounds of human life” (1992b:12).26 Baert opposes structural and positivist 
mainstreams by focusing on endogenous determinants, such as the development of self-
consciousness and “meta-descriptive capacity” (1992b:12), and by taking what Colin 
Wight refers to as a scientific realist perspective (2006:14-61).27 This perspective lends a 
different “asymmetry” to social time than the ontological claim discussed earlier. Baert’s 
social time is asymmetrical due to the distinction between the actual nature of time and 
human’s experience of time: “The real past has occurred in a particular way and . . .  
nothing in the present or future can change that. Its meaning or representation, however, 
can change and does so regularly” (1992b:76).28 
 Temporalized sociology builds on Giddens’ vision of the co-constitutive 
relationship between individual (agent) and structure and Mead’s succession of specious 
presents,29 resulting in a “pragmatist” image of time in social behavior. Pragmatist 
temporality contends that “when confronted with unexpected events . . . people may 
                                                 
25 The use of “process” indicates temporalized sociology’s link to process (or processual) philosophy 
(Baert 1992b:viii). 
26 For a recent discussion of the inextricable links between ontology and methodology, see (Wight 
2006:19). 
27 Wight defines scientific realism as the belief “that there is a reality independent of the mind(s) 
that would wish to come to know it”(Wight 2006:25-26). 
28 Baert also refers to this as an “objectivist” or “interpretativist” view of the past (1992b:76). 
29 In contrast to Giddens’ prominence, I am aware of no substantial reference of Mead in IR theory. 
Given Mead’s focus on temporality, his absence in IR may be considered symptomatic of the 
central thrust of this thesis. 
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reconstruct the past symbolically and reflect discursively upon previously tacit 
presuppositions and practices”. If collectively established, these reflections “can be . . .  
important source[s] of intended change or deliberate maintenance of social structures”.30 
 Baert offers three important contributions to IR, two of which I discuss now 
before devoting the remaining balance of the chapter to his temporalized theoretical 
framework. First, Baert distinguishes between first order self-reflection, seen as the 
contemplation of alternate lines of action within a given structure or rule-based situation, 
and second order self-reflection, which involves discovery of the processes and structures 
that constitute that rule-based situation (1992b:17). First order self-reflection corresponds 
to the “recipient present”, or the “past in now”, when conceptualizations of the present 
are unintentionally filtered through existing intellectual patterns (1992b:86). By contrast, 
second order self-reflection involves the “reconstituted present”, or the “past for now”, 
when novelty in the current context is used to rebuild images and patterns that would 
otherwise be received from the past as is (Baert 1992b:86). The important distinction is 
captured in the verbs that Baert uses to modify the present. “Received” implies passivity 
and therefore continuity; “reconstitution” implies activity and change.  
 Accordingly, Baert conceives three types of recipient past: “past as [a] sequence” 
of events that have occurred leading up to the present; “past as categorized”, which 
encompasses the meanings and values attributed to past events; and “past as order”, a 
                                                 
30 The preceding quotes are taken from Baert’s research description on his staff website at the 
University of Cambridge. <http://www.sps.cam.ac.uk/soc/staff/pbaert.html> accessed 1 December 
2007. 
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reference to the patterns and rules of social order that have been constructed and 
accepted in the past and thus affect one’s encounter with the present (1992b:87). Second 
order self-reflection can change recipient presents in the following ways: “re-sequencing” 
the past, involving the selection of past events not in the received sequence or an 
argument for a different sequence of the included events; “re-categorizing” the  past, or 
reassessing the validity of previously held categories and values into which events may be 
placed; and “re-ordering” the past—the discovery of previously undiscovered causal or 
constitutive importance in past processes, or the discovery of new processes altogether, 
both of which allow a reconceptualization of the “past-as-order” (Baert 1992b:87). 
 Second, Baert insists that both first and second order self-reflection, as well as any 
of his types of present, are amenable to collectives, not just to the individual mind. In fact, 
collective second order self-reflection is necessary (but not sufficient) for “episodic 
change” or any “rupture of structure” (1992b:89), and thus accommodates both continuity 
and change.31 This necessity differentiates Baert from earlier structurationists who place 
too much emphasis “on the accomplished production of order” and too little interest in 
“collective self-steering of the second order” (Baert 1992b:121).32 While second order self-
reflection is necessary for social change, the process itself merely uncovers the underlying 
                                                 
31 Primary sources of collective self-reflection include public discussion and debate (Baert 
1992b:144), making self-reflection amenable to textual and discourse analysis in IR. Baert’s 
emphasis on collective reflectivity represents one of his two major departures from Mead. The 
other concerns the use of second order self-reflection as a process to anticipate future situations 
and thus affect outcomes—an important point for exploring the potential of second order self-
reflection to serve status quo as well as transformative purposes (Baert 1992b:86-89). 
32 This is Baert’s main criticism of Giddens’ structuration theory; Baert refers to his own version as 
“re-structurationist” (1992b:103). 
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principles of social order. The use of those principles is up to the individual or collective 
engaged in the process. Thus, second order self-reflection can be seen as a mechanism 
supportive of both the status quo and of emancipation—themes with clear links to such 
disparate IR theories as neorealism and critical theory as well as to scholarly practices 
involved in the continued reliance on the standard temporal dichotomy. 
 Baert’s third contribution facilitates IR theoretical analysis33 through a 
temporalized comparison of social theories based on synchrony-diachrony and 
variability-invariability “axes” or binaries (1992a:318).34 Synchrony involves holding time 
constant during the analytic process and results in a ‘snapshot’ view of contemporaneous 
objects that facilitates positional or spatial comparisons. Diachrony often manifests as 
“historical range” (Hall 1999:9), and at minimum can be understood as acknowledging the 
passing of time as a contextual factor important to the research question. With regard to 
Baert’s second axis, diachronic analysis assumes some significant variability in the social 
object over time—if there were no change over time, a synchronic view would suffice. 
Such a synchronic, ‘snapshot’ view suggests that all important variation is positional or 
functional, and that this configuration does not change significantly over time. Thus, 
synchronic views assess spatial variation through an assumption of temporal continuity. 
                                                 
33 Showing that temporality can contribute to our understanding of IR theories may be referred to 
as the ‘thick’ or ‘long’ relevance of time in IR. 
34 The use of axes may evoke the 2 x 2 matrix, especially to political science readers. However, 
Baert’s temporal focus inherently refuses such an abstract spatialization (a sort of snapshot) of 
social phenomena. For a problematization of 2 x 2 matrices in IR, see (Wight 2006:86-87). 
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Diachrony focuses on temporal change, often by holding spatial relations in stasis. Baert 
combines these axes to identify three types of social theory: 
 
Theories or views of reality can be classified according to: (i) whether or not it is 
assumed that a synchronic analysis is sufficient to reveal the main principles of order; 
and (ii) (if diachronic analysis is considered necessary) whether or not these 
principles of order are conceived as changing through time. We then arrive at three 
conceptions of time: the eternal permutational view, the closed historical view, and 
the relatively-open historical view (Baert 1992a:318 emphasis added).35 
 
 Before discussing these types in relation to IR theory, it should be noted that 
temporalized sociology generally gives ample treatment to past, present, and future as 
continuously interrelating concepts and that Baert’s use of “history” in the above passage 
indicates only some inclusion of temporality, rather than a focus on the past. Also, Baert’s 
typology is meant to criticize rather than herald understandings of time in social theory. 
His critiques of the eternal permutational and closed historical views can be distilled to a 
single claim that they both spatialize time using the standard metaphors. Eternal 
permutational theories view time as a reliable cycle. Closed historical views conceive time 
as a linear-progressive arrow, flying straight and true toward an inevitable endpoint 
extrapolated from a snapshot of the present or past. Thus, while ostensibly diachronic, 
closed historical conceptions cannot account for novelty or unpredictability. Beneath 
                                                 
35 Baert’s temporalized framework relies heavily on Luhmann’s efforts to develop a social theory 
that accounts for continuity, discontinuity, and emergence. Luhmann includes a past and future 
conceived as time horizons of the present, and relies on the idea of a “relatively-open future” 
(Baert 1992b:13), which becomes Baert’s third conception of time. 
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their affect of dynamism, Baert finds only the reproduction of the same snapshot over and 
over again. In this way, his framework understands two basic options: theories that 
privilege space over time (and thus understand time using space), or theories that take a 
realistic view of time into account. Disclaimers having been dispensed with, I now turn to 
explicating and adapting Baert’s temporal framework to a review of IR theory. 
 
Eternal permutational theories: neorealism and world systems theory 
 The eternal permutational conception assumes that the fundamental principles of 
social order are fixed and that they manifest in either time or space (if holding the other 
constant). Any variations in the principles of order are understood as imperfect 
“permutations” or combinations of “eternal principles” (Baert 1992b:5). Baert traces this 
view from the Greek philosophers Plato and Parmenides to the seventeenth century 
Cartesian mathematical worldview which argues that time tells us nothing that “cannot 
be deduced from space” (1992b:5). Descartes’ adjustment is important because it tips the 
balance toward spatialized accounts. While Plato and Parmenides acknowledge that 
holding either time or space constant produces eternal permutational outcomes, Descartes 
not only privileges space over time, but also allows for the spatialization of time. Space 
was easily represented in two or three dimensions in Descartes’ lifetime; the progression 
of time enjoyed no similar technological advocate (i.e. moving pictures were centuries 
away). However, any elegance in Descartes’ proposal holds no necessary correlation to 
social reality, an assumption made by some theorists. This mistake results in overly spatial, 
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positional, and unvarying accounts of social reality which give priority to arrangement 
and repetitious cycles while marginalizing change and novelty as phenomenal aberrations 
or conceptual failures. Baert mobilizes this view primarily to criticize functionalist, 
‘snapshot’ accounts (1992b:6), epitomized in IR by structural or neorealism and by world 
systems theories (see figure one, page 50). 
 
Neorealism 
 Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism is born out of desires to distinguish the international 
realm from the domestic, to depart from an “inside-out . . . correlational logic” that relies 
on “impressionistic associations between internal conditions and international outcomes” 
(Waltz 1986b:51), and out of a commitment to “elegant” theorizing that prefers generality, 
explanation, prediction (1986b:57), and simplification (abstraction) to specificity, 
understanding, complexity, and “factual studies” (1986a:37-38). These objectives lead to a 
theory that deliberately moves away from “the reality of international practice” and 
prioritizes anarchy as an intervening variable between state intentions and international 
outcomes (Waltz 1986b:56). Responses to Waltz have been vociferous,36 and the ensuing 
debate extremely durable.37 As there have already been book-length treatments of the 
subject, I neither summarize neorealism nor the reactions against it. Instead, I focus on 
                                                 
36 By at least one account, initial reactions to Waltz impelled the development of critical theory in 
IR (Hutchings 2007). 
37 Debates concerning neorealism have subsumed the last three decades of IR. See (Ashley 1986, 
Cox 1986, Walker 1993, Wendt 1999, Wight 2006). 
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the eternal permutational (ahistorical) aspects of neorealism and the relevant debates to 
demonstrate how Waltz’s specific temporal orientation leads to particular theoretical 
outcomes. 
 Waltz’s structural image is a reaction against “traditionalist” accounts of 
international politics. While development and progress may occur inside nation-states, 
the international realm is distinguished by its sameness: “Continuities and repetitions 
defeat efforts to explain international politics by following the familiar inside-out 
formula” (Waltz 1986b:54). This criticism clearly rejects linear-progressivism, but its 
understanding of continuity is actually produced by uncertainty.  This might seem to 
indicate an “open” future, but in Waltz, contingency contributes to the anarchic 
structural variable that constrains the future. As with firms in the economic market, 
uncertainty imposes a condition of insecurity on nation-states that requires them to 
“worry” about relative gains above all other interests (1986d:102). Thus, indeterminate 
futures beget only cyclical anxiety and a structure of anarchy that always limits the range 
of possible outcomes of state behavior and interests. Waltz’s theoretical response to 
uncertainty recalls Friedrich Nietzsche’s observation that stability is often associated with 
good while contingency is linked to evil (der Derian 2001:35). Caught between 
traditionalist correlations of domestic linear-progressivism and his own perception of 
radical indeterminacy, Waltz rejects the flow of time altogether and turns instead to a 
cyclical conception in hopes of establishing and preserving predictability. 
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 In this way, Waltz’s initial rejection of diachrony38 effects his theoretical product. 
His conception of structure relies on the belief that it must “produce a uniformity of 
outcomes despite the variety of inputs” from its units (Waltz 1986b:62). This commitment 
leads to a purely spatial account. For instance, Waltz eliminates “relations” between states 
as a unit-level phenomenon that has no place in a “purely positional picture of society” 
concerned with “how [states] stand in relation to one another” (1986c:71 emphasis added). 
Furthermore, whereas Baert associates synchronic analysis with functionalism (1992b:5), 
Waltz reduces the international structure even further: “States are alike in the tasks that 
they face, though not in their abilities to perform them” (1986c:91). States are discernible 
only by their varying capabilities. Functionally, every state acts as a firm, pursuing 
survival and relative gains. 
 Changes in capabilities may lead to different sub-types of anarchic organization 
(alterations within structure), as in the move from multi- to bi-polarity after World War 
II (Waltz 1986b:59), but the overarching anarchic character of the international system is 
unalterable. This contention is tied up with Waltz’s distinction between hierarchically 
organized domestic politics and the horizontal arrangement—and therefore unitary 
systemic nature—of the international realm (1986b:58). If theory explains change across 
systems, then claims about the sameness of international politics allow no more than one 
system full of functionally undifferentiated units whose varying capabilities “can describe 
the range of likely outcomes of the actions and interactions of states within a given 
                                                 
38 For a longer discussion of Waltz as an opponent of change and progress, see (Walker 1993). 
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system” (Waltz 1986b:59 emphasis added). In this way, Waltz epitomizes the eternal 
permutational view laid out by Baert that postulates “immutability”, a “fixed and 
unchangeable” image in which any “temporal flux is nothing more than an imperfect 
reflection of an eternal world of forms” (1992b:84). In this case, the eternal structural 
form within which all variations occur is anarchy (Walker 1993:134), and all analysis is 
purely synchronic. 
 R.B.J. Walker relies on temporal metaphors to counter neorealism’s imposition of 
continuity on the international realm. He argues that neorealism, in constructing a spatial 
organizational theory, confines temporality—understood as either linear-progressive or 
cyclical—to separate political spaces. Inside the nation, progress is possible and a 
worthwhile pursuit. Outside, in the space between states, only eternal concerns of power 
and violence can be considered (Walker 1993:63). Although I disagree with his standard 
dichotomization of temporality, Walker’s analysis of Waltz is accurate. He points out that 
an assumption of homogenous continuity leads to a “spatial history” of international 
politics (1993:134), and in the absence of “radical change” or the imposition of a more 
universal political authority, the only possibility is positional, relative, capability-based 
change (1993:136). This exposes how Waltz’s initial confrontation with temporality 
pervades his subsequently spatial, and therefore ahistorical, account of international 
 24
politics. Or, as Michael C. Williams most succinctly puts it, how neorealism posits a 
structure whose “nature precludes its transcendence” (2005b:56).39 
 
World systems theory 
 Structural Marxism, or world systems theory, exemplifies the eternal 
permutational world view in a different manner. Unlike neorealism, world systems 
theory does not take a completely ahistorical view of international politics. On the 
contrary, much of the explanation offered by Immanuel Wallerstein for the rise of the 
“world capitalist system” concerns developments stemming from “a series of accidents—
historical, ecological, geographic” that situated northwest Europe as the dominant 
economy in the sixteenth century (1974:400). This development is the first of 
Wallerstein’s four stages of world capitalism, the other three being, in order: “the system-
wide recession of 1650-1730 that consolidated the European world-economy” as the 
global economy (1974:407), the industrial revolution that largely replaced “agricultural 
capitalism” (1974:408), and, finally, “the consolidation of the capitalist world-economy” 
(1974:414). While the use of stages seems an intrinsically historical or temporal mode of 
                                                 
39 Political theorist David Carvounas suggests that temporalities prohibiting an open future are 
premodern (2002:4), implying that IR theories such as neorealism may actually be “ancient” or 
“medieval”. This is ironic in the case of Waltz, who offers neorealism as an antidote to 
“traditional” theorizing and as an example of systems theory inspired by the more progressive 
natural sciences of the period. 
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analysis,40 I argue that world systems theory demonstrates a more subtle form of eternal 
permutational theorizing where history becomes reified as a cycle from which we cannot 
hope to break free. Wallerstein’s description is not as purely spatial as Waltz’s, but he 
makes certain moves that privilege the present and diminish the importance of 
temporality to his theory. 
 Like Waltz, Wallerstein insists on analyzing systems (totalities) instead of nation-
states; he also views the current world system as being without a “common political 
system” (1974:390, see also Ruggie 1986:132-36) although for Wallerstein this leads to a 
focus on world economy rather than on the conditioning effects of anarchy. Wallerstein 
begins to depart temporality and history when he argues that the emergence of a 
worldwide capitalist economy is the “obverse” of the rise of capitalism: “One does not 
cause the other. We are merely defining the same indivisible phenomenon by different 
characteristics” (1974:391). Given that Western Europe rose to prominence due to 
historical “accidents”, this is a curious contention. But it may be necessary due to 
Wallerstein’s commitment to being “analytically universal” in spite of historical 
specificity (1974:391). 
 Wallerstein further distances himself from any linear temporality by relying on 
Mao’s conception of class struggle as a continuous process, a result of his engagement with 
the debates between Russian and Chinese Communists about whether socialism could 
                                                 
40 Wallerstein himself cautions against reifying stages since they are not really “discrete but 
continuous in reality; ergo they are ‘stages’ in the ‘development’ of a social structure, a 
development which we determine however not a priori but a posteriori” (1974:389). 
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occur in one country or must be, by necessity, worldwide (1974:395). Such a view of class 
struggle replaces any association between stages and linear development with a more 
permutational understanding by which “we can talk then of the relative tightness or 
looseness of the world-system as an important variable and seek to analyze why this 
dimension tends to be cyclical in nature, as it seems to have been for several hundred 
years” (Wallerstein 1974:406). This move reifies the longue durée approach initially 
associated with class struggle by replacing a developmental time frame of centuries with a 
cyclical vision (Wallerstein 1974:396). This is a kind of presentist myopia that 
understands the current situation as the end-state of world history,41 the future being 
constituted solely by eternal permutations of this present. 
 Cyclicality in hand, Wallerstein commences a spatial conceptualization of the 
world system in which the prosperous core exploits peripheral regions for natural 
resources and cheap labor. An essential component of this hypothesis is the idea of the 
semi-periphery, a region that separates core from periphery as well as sub-divides the 
exploited “majority into a larger lower stratum and a smaller middle stratum” in the 
interest of preserving the core’s political dominance (1974:404). The manner of 
conceptualization here is highly suggestive of Waltz’s relative positional arrangement as 
well as his turn away from linear historical explanations. So is Wallerstein’s assertion that 
“one cannot reasonably explain the strength of various state machineries at specific 
                                                 
41 On the tendency of IR scholars to conflate an analysis of the present with historical lineage, see 
(Schmidt 1998). 
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moments of the history of the modern world system primarily in terms of a genetic-
cultural line of argumentation, but rather in terms of the structural role a country plays in 
the world economy” (1974:403). The resulting configuration self-maintains by ignoring 
the possibility and importance of change. The core has little incentive to change since it is 
in the dominant position. The periphery has little means to change no matter its desires. 
And discontinuities are insignificant in the semi-periphery, whose “specific economic 
role is not all that important” compared to its role as “exploited [by the core] and 
exploiter [of the periphery]” (Wallerstein 1974:405).42 
 Consequently, Wallerstein’s readings of historical international phenomena serve 
his vision of a tightening or loosening world capitalist cycle, often at the expense of those 
events’ intrinsic significance. For instance, he views the Russian Revolution as the 
reaction of “a semi-peripheral country” that had begun to “decline towards a peripheral 
status” but managed to salvage its spatial position “by using the classic technique of 
mercantilist semi-withdrawal from the world economy” (Wallerstein 1974:411). This 
explanation does little justice to the bold, non-permutational, temporal vision displayed 
in the writings of Marx that inspired revolt (Hanson 1997). Similarly, Wallerstein 
understands World War II as being caused in part by Nazism’s attempt to “recoup lost 
ground” for Germany in the world system, and as the means by which the US accessed 
                                                 
42 In light of this configuration, the inward-domestic turn of subsequent world systems work, with 
foci on “hegemonic” civil societies (historic blocs or structures) as sources of change in the 
international system (superstructure) may be seen as the only option available to those who 
desired a world systems approach that could accommodate continuity and change, see (Cox 1983). 
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the core of the system. Thus, the period often associated with the Cold War can be 
viewed as the fourth, consolidating phase of the capitalist world economy (1974:414). 
Finally, decolonization after World War II, instead of marking a revolution in self-
determination, becomes simply a means of “tightening” the world capitalist system by 
reinstituting the semi-periphery, thus “mobiliz[ing] productive potential” and mitigating 
the polarization of core and periphery (1974:412,414). Such readings of world politics 
offer little more than the image of countries jockeying for position amid concentric 
regions of influence, an image more reminiscent of the organization of English football 
leagues than momentous and sometimes catastrophic ruptures whose political effects are 
still being discovered. 
 Given his structural turn, it is unsurprising that Wallerstein echoes Waltz’s 
opinion that the only source of change available to the international realm is not only 
wholesale systemic in nature, but reliant on the appearance of a global political authority. 
Wallerstein avoids pure ahistoricism in that he holds out a nominal possibility of “the 
creation of a new kind of world system” based on the emergence of a “socialist world 
government” (1974:415), whereas Waltz’s international anarchy is all there ever can be. 
But Wallerstein’s myopic move effectively reifies the present as part of a capitalist cycle 
from which there can be little hope of breaking free. Therefore, both theorists pre-
explain any diversity in future outcomes as hazy, imperfect reflections of what came 
before and what is thus already established. 
 
 29
Closed historical theories: liberal democratic peace theory and teleological constructivism 
 The closed historical conception retains an assumption of the invariability of 
ordering principles, but breaks methodologically with the eternal permutational view in 
claiming that those principles can only be revealed by holding space constant and 
analyzing diachronically (Baert 1992b:6). This conception is rooted in Judeo-Christian 
theology and Enlightenment philosophies of history found in Kant and Condorcet (Baert 
1992b:7). Its logic relies on extrapolating from the known present or past into the future, 
which will therefore strongly resemble the present or recent past. A closed historical 
view affects some dynamism through diachrony, but nevertheless privileges continuity 
over disjuncture. This is because its dynamic element is restricted to the trajectory of past 
or present events and order identified in the snapshot view of society that serves as its 
basis. As such, the closed historical conception always runs the risk of slipping into 
teleological explanations, proffering views of social time as a “serial, orientated, 
cumulative type: the discovery of . . . evolution in terms of ‘progress’ ”, which bolster the 
development of a technique disciplinaire based on a sequenced, final future predicted 
from the present (Foucault, quoted in Baert 1992b:8). In sociology, this view can be 
linked to “planning for freedom” and rational control policies (Baert 1992b:10). Within IR, 
liberal-idealism, or liberal democratic peace theory, and Alexander Wendt’s particular 
brand of constructivism typify closed historical theories vulnerable to temporal critique 
(see figure one, page 50). 
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Liberal democratic peace theory 
 A fashionable topic in the decades after the end of the Cold War, liberal 
democratic peace theory (LDPT)43 makes three claims. First, it observes that liberal 
democracies rarely fight each other. Second, and consequently, “while democracies 
undoubtedly have as many conflicts of interests as other kinds of regimes, they do not see 
war as an appropriate method for resolving such disputes between democracies” (Rengger 
2000:114). This claim weds the initial empirical observation to a belief that democracies 
are cultures of peaceful conflict resolution and contain bureaucratic-political mechanisms 
that prevent easy resort to violence. However, this union portends less security for non-
democratic regimes: “although liberal democracies rarely (never) fight each other they are 
likely to fight non-democracies” (Rengger 2000:114). The reasoning behind the third 
claim follows that of the second, explaining different results by the lack of certainty on 
the part of democratic regimes about the behavior, and absence of institutional checks on 
that behavior, of their non-democratic counterparts.44 While the literature on LDPT is 
substantial, the reasoning typically proceeds along these lines,45 envisioning a linear-
progression stretching from the empirically known present (and recent past) through the 
                                                 
43 I follow Rengger in distinguishing LDPT from the earlier theory of the liberal peace associated 
with the first era of globalization during the late nineteenth / early twentieth centuries because 
arguments of that time made much less of the democratic nature of states than the importance of 
interconnectedness due to globalized trade (2000:113). For a historical account of the first era of 
globalization, see (Ferguson 2006). For a vivid account, see (Kern 1983). 
44 As a logical corollary to the third claim, two non-democratic regimes are viewed as highly likely 
to go to war, since neither possesses cultural or political constraints on use of force. 
45 For a seminal effort, see (Russett 1993). For an overview of the debate, see (Owen 1994, Spiro 
1994, Elman 1997). For a more general examination of the link between domestic politics and 
international conflict, see (Clark and Nordstrom 2005). 
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future toward a predictable conclusion. The practical and theoretical dangers of this 
reasoning highlight the vulnerabilities of closed historical views. 
 LDPT begins with an empirical observation of the present and recent past that, in 
the second half of the twentieth century, armed conflicts between democracies have 
diminished to near obsolescence (Rosato 2003:599-600, Maoz and Russett 1993).46 The 
first ensuing normative claim extrapolates this present into the future and constrains 
contingency toward a closed historical world view: since democracies do not fight each 
other, and since the world “community [is] moving toward democracy” (Modelski 
1990:24), the world must be growing more peaceful—the future will strongly resemble 
the present. The second normative claim regarding conflict involving at least one non-
democratic regime has come to serve a legitimating purpose in political practice, so I will 
address it a little later. 
 An important theoretical effect of LDPT is that, in an effort to construct a linear 
progression supportive of its empirical claim and first normative extension, proponents 
use rarefied evidence. For instance, LDP theorists define ‘war’ by a minimum threshold of 
1000 battle fatalities (Russett 1993:12-16).47 Such a definition omits much of the 
international violence conducted since 1945, including terrorism, covert operations, 
                                                 
46 Some LDPT advocates have attempted to extend the temporal window from which the image is 
drawn further back in history, see (Doyle 1983). 
47 LDP theorists also take liberties with the meaning of liberal democracy. For instance, Owen 
specifies a “liberal democracy as a state that instantiates liberal ideas, one where liberalism is the 
dominant ideology and citizens have leverage over war decisions. . . . When liberals run the 
government, relations with fellow democracies are harmonious. When illiberals govern, relations 
may be rockier” (1994:89). For a more extensive discussion of the flexible meaning of ‘democracy’, 
including definitions assigned by politicians, see (Rosato 2003:586,595). 
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proxy wars, (counter-) insurgencies, and more (Rengger 2000:120), effectively 
disciplining a theoretical concern of IR.48 Thus, the peace that LDPT observes and 
predicts may actually be just “the absence of a certain kind of ‘war’ ” (Rengger 2000:118). 
This criticism also begs the question of whether democracies are actually fighting each 
other less, or simply going about it below the macro-scale on which LDPT focuses.49 
Finally, such definitional omissions suggest that, if theorists are to deduce a linear 
movement from the present picture, the more accurate lines would be simply away from 
conventional, major interstate war rather than toward any particular future. 
 A more practical disciplining effect of LDPT arises from its second normative 
claim regarding the greater likelihood of violence in any conflict involving at least one 
non-democratic regime. “The thesis of the liberal democratic peace actually helps to 
provide a normative justification for the role and power of the dominant states in 
contemporary world politics” (Rengger 2000:120). That this observation, or even an 
attempt at liberal democratic hegemony,50 may seem obvious now is largely attributable 
to the rise of neoconservatism in the US and the ongoing war in Iraq. For instance, the 
neoconservative contention that democracy is not just a method of government but also 
the mark of a “healthy political order” displays clear links to LDPT (Williams 2005a:309-
                                                 
48 Williams has recently discussed the “discipline of the democratic peace” in terms of Western 
European security practice after World War II (2007 Chp. 3). 
49 If violence is substituted for “war” or, especially, “major war”, then it becomes possible to claim 
that “liberal democracies have behaved much as ‘states’ have always behaved—that is, badly” 
(Rengger 2000:120). 
50 This possibility is discussed in (Brilmayer 1994). 
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10).51 Also, the George W. Bush administration’s rationale for invading Iraq in 2003 relied 
on three claims related to LDPT: 1) a non-democratic regime’s willingness to use weapons 
of mass destruction,52 2) the suffering of the Iraqi people under a despotic ruler 
(Woodward 2002:339),53 and 3) the effort to spread liberty and peace throughout the 
Middle East.54 Regardless of the credibility of these claims, the outcomes to date have 
been neither democratic nor peaceful. In fact, violence in the region today is more 
intensive than at any time since the Iran-Iraq war—a conflict between two non-
democracies. 
 The Iraq War and LDPT expose another flaw of the closed historical conception. 
This error concerns the connection between the initial picture, or starting point, and the 
constrained account of the future that emanates from it. Closed historical conceptions 
                                                 
51 For a critique connecting LDPT and neoconservatism as “eschatological” (predictive of a final 
endpoint) variants of IR theorizing, see (Steele 2007a). Eschatologies can be distinguished from 
teleological ideas, covered in the next section, which understand causation as growing out of that 
final end-state, equilibrium point, or attractor. 
52 Vice-President Cheney, discussing the situation in Iraq if Saddam Hussein had not been removed 
from power: “You'd have a man who had a demonstrated capacity for violence, who'd started two 
wars, who had, in fact, been involved with weapons of mass destruction, who had every intention 
of going back to it when the sanctions were lifted” (2006). 
53 President Bush claimed that in “Iraq, we are helping the long suffering people of that country to 
build a decent and democratic society at the center of the Middle East. Together we are 
transforming a place of torture chambers and mass graves into a nation of laws and free institutions. 
This undertaking is . . . critical to our security” (2003). 
54 Vice-President Cheney conceptualized the war in Iraq as follows: “In the Middle East, we are 
encouraging free markets, democracy, and tolerance, because these are the ideas and the 
aspirations that overcome violence, and turn societies to the pursuits of peace” (2003). On the 
proposed “domino effect” of democracy in the region, President Bush averred that “A free Iraq will 
inspire democratic reformers from Damascus to Tehran, and send a signal across the broader 
Middle East that the future belongs not to terrorism but to freedom. A free Iraq will show the 
power of liberty to change the world.” In those same remarks, President Bush also confirmed that 
he “believe[s] that democracy helps keep the peace” (2006). 
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predict that the future will closely mirror the present or recent past. Recall that part of 
LDPT’s starting point, or recent past, is liberal democratic culture and institutional design, 
both of which LDPT envisions as constraining the resort to force by policy makers. But 
democratic institutions and values do not exist in stasis. They exist in actual time—in all 
its contingency—and are thus susceptible to, among other things, IR theories that 
legitimate foreign policy.55 Linear-progressive accounts such as LDPT forget that the 
initial picture may have shifted while progress “away” from that starting point was 
(ostensibly) being made. Recently, the US run-up to the Iraq war displayed a remarkable 
absence of balanced political debate or bureaucratic brakes on the use of force,56 




                                                 
55 This is a form of subject-object contamination, in which statements made about an actor as an 
object of study affect that actor’s beliefs, commitments, and future behavior, see (Steele 2007a). 
Other phenomena that might be seen as altering democratic regimes internally are a general 
disinterest in the political process, or the descent into nihilism—a core component of the 
neoconservative reaction against “corrupt liberal society” (Williams 2005a:312). 
56 Classical realist Reinhold Niebuhr was openly skeptical of the ability of democratic populaces to 
stem the momentum of policy elites: “Theoretically it is possible to have a national electorate so 
intelligent, that the popular impulses and the ulterior interests of special groups are brought under 
the control of a rational mind. But practically the rational understanding of political issues remains 
such a minimum force that national unity of action can be achieved only upon such projects as are 
either initiated by the self-interest of the dominant groups, in control of the government, or 
supported by the popular emotions and hysterias which from time to time run through the nation” 
(2001 [1932]:88). The public debate on the justifications for the Iraq war has occurred mostly after 
the initiation of hostilities, as evidenced in the 2004 and 2006 elections as well as the 2007-2008 
primaries. Many citizens of newly democratic Iraq might have preferred that their US counterparts, 
as democratic exemplars, had exercised their constitutional rights a little sooner. 
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Teleological constructivism 
 I shall soon argue that constructivism generally represents a relatively open 
historical world view. However, recent declarations made by a most prominent 
constructivist, Alexander Wendt, have exchanged openness for bold prediction. So it 
becomes necessary to distinguish between mainstream (broadly understood) 
constructivism—for which behaviors, identities, and interests are co-constitutive and the 
future is contingent on but not necessarily predictable from those components—and 
Wendt’s conservative constructivism—which finds in the same features and in the 
condition of anarchy a causal power channeling or disciplining international behavior 
toward the singular outcome of a world state. 
 Interestingly, Wendt distinguishes his teleological approach from “liberal 
progressivism” by pointing out the latter’s indeterminacy: “The forecast is based on 
extrapolating law-like regularities from the past into the future, assuming certain 
conditions continue to hold. Since there is no guarantee they will, we cannot say that any 
given future is inevitable” (2003:492). Since Wendt is “not concerned here with historical 
contingencies or timing” (2003:491),  he excises them by turning to self-organization 
theory, “which hypothesizes that order in nature emerges . . . ‘spontaneously’ from the 
channeling of system dynamics by structural boundary conditions toward particular end-
states” (2003:492).57 Wendt combines this form of emergence with constructivist 
                                                 
57 Wendt’s most substantial work prior to his conservative turn nevertheless hints at this move. In 
discussing “type” identities, which are those characteristics of actors that are recognizable, shared, 
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principles of collective identity formation and recognition (2003:507-16), and with 
anarchy, which “conditions struggles for recognition . . . by making it possible to seek 
recognition through violence and by generating improved military technology that makes 
such violence increasingly intolerable” (2003:517), in order to propose a Hegelian 
teleological conclusion writ global. Whereas Hegel finds that the struggle for recognition 
between individuals results in the state but insists that states will remain autonomous due 
to the acceptable costs of political violence, Wendt’s era of mass destructive devices alters 
the calculus to produce an outcome of “supranational solidarity” (2003:493). This 
conclusion will arrive in five stages:58 1) system of states; 2) society of states; 3) world 
society; 4) collective security; and 5) world state, accomplished by the establishment of a 
global sovereign authority and the replacement of state sovereignty by the concept of 
recognition, which Wendt characterizes as “particularism within universalism” 
(2003:517-25). 
 Wendt differs from LDPT in both argumentation—based on self-organization and 
anarchy instead of democratic culture—and conclusion—a single global authority instead 
of LDPT’s plural but pacific international system. However, temporal affinities between 
the two efforts persist. Both propose an inevitable linear progression from the observed 
present and recent past toward a conclusively more peaceful future. Thus, some of the 
                                                                                                                                           
and relevant in social interactions, Wendt refers to social systems as self-organizing in terms of 
intrinsically separating relevant from irrelevant identities simply through social interaction. He 
illustrates this point by reference to the ongoing internalization of “the belief that democratic 
states do not make war on each other” (Wendt 1999:226-27). 
58 The first three stages rely heavily on English School theorists such as Hedley Bull (2002 [1977]). 
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problems associated with the linear-progressive temporality of LDPT discussed above also 
manifest in Wendt. 
 First, teleological proposals also discipline history, albeit differently than LDPT. 
Teleology gives meaning to past, present, and future processes by explaining their 
relevance or utility to an end-state of the organism (system, collective, or individual) in 
question. Wendt refers to this as forward- and backward-looking explanation (2003:497), 
using an analogy from biology: “Imagine trying to explain the development of an 
organism without a conception of what it will look like as an adult—clearly something 
would be missing from such an account” (2003:501).59 An initial reaction to this analogy 
might be to ask what mature, adult version(s) of world politics we have to explain the 
“development” of our current situation, which would entail a turn to history. I argue that 
a commitment to temporality in theorizing necessitates a different way of going back in 
time that problematizes Wendt’s teleology from within. 
 Wendt’s approach is “developmental” or forward looking, and thus requires us to 
ask “how some trait or behavior serves the functions of a larger system” (2003:497), which 
in turn requires envisioning an end-state. As Wendt himself observes, teleology has a 
long history (2003:496); and he builds on two such historical proposals: Kant’s “pacific 
federation of republican states” and Hegel’s emergence of the state as the Spirit (2003:493). 
                                                 
59 In this way, teleology is the inverse of ahistorical, cyclical accounts like world systems theory 
that read in the present, the inevitable conclusion of history, and in the future, only the 
continuing cycle of this conclusion. Wendt’s teleology imagines a future and then analyzes the 
present and recent past so as to ensure progress toward that imagined future. 
 38
However, Wendt fails to acknowledge a counterfactual challenge to teleology60—that if 
Kant and Hegel had not made their proposals (whether right or wrong), the world Wendt 
confronts might be very different. Put another way, he ignores the productive, creative, 
and constitutive effects of teleological, and all linear-progressive, proposals. Wendt also 
ignores the cautionary value of historical examples. Examining how others have erred in 
their imaginings of end-states, and the effects of those efforts on the more general 
imagination of theorists as well as on real-world events, may do much to attenuate or 
even comprehensively discredit teleological theorizing. 
 Furthermore, Wendt’s theory exerts a disciplining influence on international 
politics that will be ethically unconscionable to most. Dual commitments to teleology and 
constructivism necessitate a search for endogenous causes of increasing order in the 
international system. Wendt locates these in self-organizational “positive feedback, in 
which behaviors or effects are amplified by a dynamic of ‘increasing returns’ or 
‘autocatalysis’. Importantly, when positive feedback effects cross a threshold or ‘tipping 
point’ the resulting . . .61 dynamics can induce systems change” (Wendt 2003:499). As this 
                                                 
60 This phrase evokes an array of possibilities. The most straightforward version used here is 
counterfactual teleology—if what was proposed as the end-state was not proposed, how would the 
historical future have unfolded differently? Alternatively, teleological counterfactuality might 
provide some much-needed self-reflexivity in teleological theorizing. Teleological 
counterfactualizing would consider if certain events had unfolded differently in history, whether 
different end-states then would have been proposed at some point along the way. 
61 In the interest of transparency, I want to note that I have elided the phrase “non-linear” from 
Wendt’s quote in the pursuit of clarity. This is because the non-linearity he refers to is in the 
context of the difference between “efficient” causation (the province of positivist mechanical 
accounts) and “formal” or “final” causality which deal with the causal power of structures, 
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part of Wendt’s hypothesis is concerned with “micro-foundations” which show “how 
order can emerge in a system as a result of the interactions of elements” (2003:498), it 
begs the question of whether noxious affairs such as the decades-long pandemic of ethnic 
violence should be seen as an ongoing processes of positive feedback whose tipping point 
has simply not yet been reached.  
 This critique is not meant to link Wendt to arguments diminishing or 
rationalizing genocide. Rather, I mean to illustrate how his brand of linear progressivism, 
much like LDPT, disciplines theoretical conceptions of social reality. In this case, Wendt’s 
desire to connect the present to a peaceful end-point “attractor” (2003:501) creates a 
slipstream that consumes all international affairs, even some that might otherwise be 
viewed as evidence of regress. This is a fundamental flaw in linear-progressive or closed 
historical theories: by theoretical necessity all roads—no matter how circuitous or 
treacherous—lead to Rome. 
 
Relatively open historical theories: constructivism and classical realism 
 Unlike the two previous views, which rely on a spatial conception of time, the 
relatively open historical view treats space and time as having comparable significance 
(but not theoretical equivalency). It assumes that all ordering principles are variable and 
susceptible to change in “every present” (Baert 1992b:8). Every present thus holds the 
                                                                                                                                           
processes, and systemic “purpose” (Wendt 2003:495). As such, “non-linear” here should not be 
understood as a refutation of my holistic view of Wendt’s constructivism as historically closed. 
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possibility of disjuncture between the past and future.62 This conception is epitomized by 
Mead’s contention that “every present contains ‘the novel’ (that is, ‘the emergent’), which 
is not only not predicted but actually unpredictable, and thus a point of departure for a 
new, symbolically-reconstructed past, as well as for goals and desires in the future” 
(quoted in Baert 1992b:9). A relatively open historical world view understands novelty as 
stimulating reality through these ongoing reconstructions and thus contravenes 
conventional sociological understandings of novelty—based on closed historical 
conceptions—as the product of scientific and policy interventions (Baert 1992b:10). 
 An open temporal conception also transitively grants time an ontological status: 
Each specious present holds the possibility of novelty, and novelty itself constitutes 
reality by contravening past symbolic reconstructions. Time, understood as the flow of 
these specious moments, thus functions as the enabler of new novelties and thus new 
realities. Without time, only recycled recollections would pertain. However, even those 
recollections were at some point constituted by some symbolic reconstruction stimulated 
by some relatively novel event that emerged in some moment. Thus, time has ontological 
significance as the present impulse to new realities in the future and the past basis for 
persistent recollections in the present. Time is not only real in the relatively open 
historical conception. In fact, it produces reality. 
                                                 
62 Baert links this conception of time to research in the natural sciences on thermodynamics 
including bifurcation and dissipative structures (1992b:8). It is significant that Baert limits the view 
of the present to a subjective division between past and future rather than some discrete objective 
duration, a distinction on which I reflect in chapter four. 
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 Most significantly, an implication can be drawn from Baert’s exposition of the 
relatively open historical world view that any theory hoping to explain novelty or change 
must take temporal issues, in all their indeterminacy, into account. Accordingly, I turn to 
two theoretical movements in IR that incorporate continuity and change without relying 
on the restrictive spatial metaphors of progressive linearity or cyclicality. These 
movements, mainstream constructivism (henceforth referred to simply as constructivism) 
and classical realism, envision open futures based in part on their (implicit) assumption 
that only novelty truly recurs (see figure one, page 50). I propose that many of the 
strengths of constructivist and classical realist theorizing stem from this open view of 
time. Furthermore, I argue that their similar approaches to time bolster recent arguments 




 In IR, constructivism comes closest to a truly open historical world view. This is 
unsurprising, given its links to Baert via structuration theory. With the exception of 
Wendt, foundational constructivist works display a fairly consistent openness or 
indeterminacy in their views of the future, avoiding the cyclical cynicism of neorealism 
and world systems theory as well as the disciplining progressivism found in liberal 
democratic peace theory and Wendt’s conservative constructivism. I argue that the reason 
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that constructivism can avoid ahistoricism and closed historicism is that it relies on a 
fusion of linearity and cyclicality at a basic level of social organization. 
 “Constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes 
and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and 
epistemic interpretations of the material world” (Adler 1997:322). This is based on an 
“emphasis on the ontological reality of intersubjective knowledge” (Adler 1997:322). Such 
knowledge “persists beyond the lives of individual social actors, embedded in social 
routines and practices as they are reproduced by interpreters who participate in their 
production and workings” (Adler 1997:327). 
 Constructivism weds social interaction to both agents and structures. Nicholas 
Onuf argues that people become “human” through their social relations predicated on 
language (1998:59, also see Adler 1997:328). Humans in turn “make society and society 
makes people. This is a continuous, two-way process”, linked by rules, that students can 
only hope to understand if they “start in the middle” (Onuf 1998:59). Thus, 
constructivism avoids the fixed start- and end-points of linear progressive theories. 
 Similarly, Emanuel Adler’s view of constructivism as a median theoretical stance 
necessitates the avoidance of both poles of the temporal dichotomy—constructivism can 
only be “synthetic” because it is neither “pessimistic [n]or optimistic by design” 
(1997:323). As Onuf denies linear-progressive constructivism, Adler ensures that 
intersubjectivity is much more than a loop: “[K]nowledge structures are continually 
constituted and reproduced by members of a community and their behavior. At the same 
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time, however, they determine the boundaries between what these agents consider to be 
real and unreal” (1997:326-27). In this way, cyclical interactions actually provide impulse 
force for both continuity and change—the acceptance of social facts by a community 
grants continuity to what have, at one time, been new or unique ideas.63 For the purposes 
of this essay, the crucial implication drawn from these nuances is that “progress 1) is not 
based only on what theorists say but also, and primarily, on what political actors do; 2) 
occurs through the redefinition of identities and interests of the actors themselves; and 3) 
is inescapably about universal normative ideas, even if their meaning varies from time to 
                                                 
63 Adler refers to this as “cognitive evolution”, the cyclical impulse for change. It is important to 
distinguish Adler’s phrase from ‘evolution’ in a more deterministic sense, as found in some liberal 
accounts of the connection between knowledge acquisition and optimistic/progressive political 
outcomes. By cognitive evolution, Adler simply means that “at any point in time and place of a 
historical process, institutional or social facts may be socially constructed by collective 
understandings of the physical and the social world that are subject to authoritative (political) 
processes and thus to evolutionary change” (1997:339). Adler’s evolution refers only to the 
emergence of social conventions, not inevitable progress toward a determinate end-state. These 
social conventions can only emerge through the communication and diffusion of ideas and, 
crucially, through the “creation of political stakes”. By contrast, liberal institutionalism prioritizes 
the potential for cognitive evolutionism to create a basis for cooperation and “transcend ‘prevailing 
lines of ideological cleavage’” (Krasner 1982:203). Krasner’s focus on overcoming political contests 
seems, to me, to be a higher-order version of cognitive evolution whereas Adler’s insists only that 
some amount of cooperation is necessary for any social interaction, and that that cooperation must 
have come from somewhen involving a prior social interaction. Krasner and Stein use health 
policy as an example of higher order cognitive evolution, claiming that the increase in scientific 
knowledge de-politicizes health regulations so that “national behavior [is] determined by an 
international regime, or at least a set of rules, dictated by accepted scientific knowledge” (Krasner 
1982:203-4, Stein 1993 [1982]:50). However, recent work on the emergence of a “counter-
epistemic” community in South Africa, which opposed accepted scientific knowledge about AIDS 
treatment because of collective beliefs about European exploitation, goes a long way toward 
discrediting Krasner’s and Stein’s optimism (Youde 2005). Modelski utilizes an interesting 
understanding of evolution as “selection” of the “hidden plan of nature” that he has conveniently 
re-discovered—Kant’s perpetual peace. Modelski concludes that world politics is a mechanism of 
“evolutionary learning”, an antidote to other studies of world politics which have “had problems 
coping with the time dimension and with political transformation at the global level” (1990:4-5,1). 
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time and place to place” (Adler 1997:334). Focusing on political actors’ behavior and 
internalization of social constructs retains the possibility of both cyclical and linear-
progressive outcomes, thus preserving an essentially open view of the future. Onuf’s and 
Adler’s careful theoretical constructions mesh well with Baert’s focus on pragmatic 
reflectivity, in which understandings and explanations of the past influence actors’ 
confrontations with the present but are always re-negotiable in that present and 
influential in the view of the future. 
 Unintended consequences also play a prominent role in Onuf’s understanding of 
institutions, which are constituted through agent-agent and agent-environment 
interactions. Unintended consequences, rather than impeding this process, actually 
contribute to the overall resolution of the institution because, while they may be 
unanticipated by some agents, they nevertheless result from the intentional acts of other 
agents within the system (Onuf 1998:61,63). In support of this argument, Onuf chooses 
the conspicuous example of the “perfect competitive market” (1998:61). Market price has 
been used by Waltz to demonstrate the “tyranny of small decisions”, whose aggregate 
outcomes tend to thwart individual intentions (1986d:105). But on a constructivist 
reading, the “unintended consequence of setting a price for that good” becomes simply 
part of the “recursive” negotiation of the societal structure of the market (Onuf 1998:61). 
 Onuf’s exposition of constructivism also suggests a compelling parallel with 
Baert’s first and second order self-reflection. The importance of agents’ acceptance of 
unintended consequences in their social institution may be seen as an instance of first 
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order self-reflection, or a commitment to choose to follow (or not to follow) the “rules” of 
the situation in pursuit of specific results. Likewise, distinguishing between structure, 
understood as “what observers see”, and institutions, which are “what agents act within” 
hints at Baert’s second order self-reflective practice of the discovery and contestation or 
maintenance of the foundations and processes that make possible those “rules” that affect 
action (Onuf 1998:62). Understood in this way, any theoretical investigation of social 
organization is an exercise in second order self-reflection necessitating an account of 
novelty and change. Constructivism does this by first denying spatialized views of 
temporality, which in turn accommodates unintended consequences within a broader 
system of social interactions. Analysis of those consequences then exposes previously 
unknown institutional ligatures, effecting second order self-reflection. 
 
Classical realism 
 Another theoretical movement exhibiting a relatively open historical conception 
is classical realism, likely the most widely recognized and misunderstood theory of 
international relations. Critics of classical realism often conflate it with neorealism 
(Barkin 2003:331) or accept Waltz’s claim that neorealism is a significant improvement on, 
and thus a replacement for, classical realism. Recently, a growing body of literature has 
sought to rehabilitate classical realism as ethically inclined theory (Lang 2001, Lebow 
2003, Williams 2005a, 2005b, Steele 2007b). In the following discussion, I argue that 
classical realism and neorealism should be considered separately based on their temporal 
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conceptualizations, a distinction that may assist the aforementioned ethical recovery 
project. To do this, I argue that classical realism is neither historically closed nor 
deterministic, but is instead open to, and dependent on, contingency. As such, classical 
realism is compatible with pragmatic temporality and constructivism. 
 Classical realism’s conflation with neorealism often includes its characterization 
as eternal permutational. For example, Robert Cox, in his initial response to Waltz, writes,  
 
Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, . . . though individuals of considerable 
historical learning, . . . have tended to adopt the fixed ahistorical view of the 
framework for action characteristic of problem solving theory, rather than standing 
back from this framework, in the manner of E. H. Carr, and treating it as historically 
conditioned and thus susceptible to change (1986:211).  
 
Similarly, Walker’s postmodern evisceration of “political realism” claims that it should be 
treated as “an historically specific consequence” of sovereignty and not, “as is so often 
asserted, an expression of ahistorical essences and structural necessities” (1993:7). But 
classical realism is self-consciously rooted in an indeterminate temporality. This can be 
shown by reference to the thinking of two prominent realists: Morgenthau's concern 
with history, novelty, and prudence, and Carr’s insistence that all judgment is historically 
conditioned. 
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 Morgenthau poses a realist theory of international politics inspired by the 
confrontation with contingency. Presenting his second principle of realism,64 “interest 
defined in terms of power” (1993 [1948]:5), Morgenthau includes ethical concerns while 
insisting that those concerns on their own are not enough for good policy. This is because 
there is “a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible—between what is 
desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete 
circumstances of time and place” (Morgenthau 1993 [1948]:7). Forgetting this distinction 
can derail morally intentioned policy if “residues of formerly adequate modes of thought 
and action [are] rendered obsolete by a new social reality” (Morgenthau 1993 [1948]:7).  
 For Morgenthau, novelty places continuity and change in tension: “man responds 
to social situations with repetitive patterns. . . . Yet when matters are subject to dynamic 
change, traditional patterns are no longer appropriate: they must be replaced by new ones 
reflecting such change” (1993 [1948]:7-8).65 Knowledge and policy making are thus 
dependent on self-reflection. “That which reveals itself as a simple truth in retrospect was 
either completely unknown in prospect or else could not be determined by anything but 
an uncertain hunch” (Morgenthau 1993 [1948]:21), an observation reminiscent of Baert’s 
contention that discursive knowledge only becomes available after the “I” acts, when the 
                                                 
64 In addition to the second, I also cover the third and fourth principles in this section. The other 
principles are, in the order given: 1) the objectivity of politics based on human nature; 5) the 
inescapable particularity of national morality; and 6) the autonomy of the political sphere 
(Morgenthau 1993 [1948]:4-13). 
65 One of the sources of novelty that Morgenthau lists is international terrorism, a phenomenon 
sometimes invoked to antiquate realism. For an argument that realism is ill-equipped to contend 
with international terrorism, see (Beyer 2006). For an attempt to “revise” realism in response to 
militant Muslim groups, see (Matesan 2006). 
 48
actor can then reflect on her act as a “me” (1992b:121). Unlike neorealism, which 
attempts to discipline contingency by attaching to it rigorous and predictable structural 
affects, Morgenthau embraces contingency as an argument for carefully crafted policy. 
 Morgenthau qualifies his second principle with a third: “interest defined as power 
is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept 
with a meaning that is fixed once and for all” (1993 [1948]:10). Instead, “the kind of 
interests determining political action in a particular period of history depend upon the 
political and cultural context” (Morgenthau 1993 [1948]:11).66 Williams has argued that 
Morgenthau’s reaction to Weimar Germany’s descent into Nazism committed him to such 
an understanding of the ‘political’ as inextricably linked to historical contingencies 
(2005b:83), and thus requiring ethical delimitation to mitigate violent abuses.  
 Finally, Morgenthau’s fourth principle relies on the vagaries of international 
politics to champion “the supreme virtue of politics”—prudence, defined as the 
“consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action (1993 [1948]:12). 
Prudence reins supreme because it represents the best possible reconciliation of abstract 
morality and political possibility. For classical realism to be closed historical or eternally 
permutational, one or the other of abstract morality or political possibility would have to 
be preeminent. In such a situation, either moral ends would be blindly pursued with an 
aura of certainty, or capabilities would count as morality itself. Morgenthau obviates both 
                                                 
66 Interestingly, one political context that Morgenthau openly considers is the replacement of the 
nation-state system with a “larger unit” of a “different character” (1993 [1948]:12), less 
deterministic but still reminiscent of Wendt’s teleology. 
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conceptions by holding morality and possibility in tension, predicting not specific results 
(as neorealism and LDPT do) but rather reminding those who pursue specific results to 
take heed of this inevitable but infinitely variable tension. 
 Like Morgenthau, Carr is concerned with the past as an antidote to the universal 
morality espoused by utopianism in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries (1964 
[1939]:65). For Carr, there is “no reality outside the historical process” (1964 [1939]:67). 
Those who ignore this process when evaluating events run the risk of starting “from the 
presupposition that things could not have turned out otherwise than they did” (Carr 1964 
[1939]:67). Thus, utopian universal morality was, in reality, a historical outcome—as will 
be all moralities that seek to supplant it—summed up as “What was, is right” (Carr 1964 
[1939]:67). The crux of the matter is the “relative and pragmatic character of thought 
itself” (Carr 1964 [1939]:67-68). Building on German sociological accounts of knowledge, 
Carr contends that thought, while sometimes shaped directly by external events and 
always relative, is primarily purposeful. “For the realist” he writes, “truth is ‘no more than 
the perception of discordant experience pragmatically adjusted for a particular purpose 
and for the time being’ ” (Carr 1964 [1939]:71).67 This links between Carr’s comment and 
Baert’s pragmatism could hardly be stronger. Combining this pragmatism with 
Morgenthau’s cautionary effort to delimit politics in the shadow of contingency indicates 
that in addition to the hidden ethical dimension discussed earlier, classical realism also 
                                                 
67 Examples of purposeful thought include theories “designed to discredit an enemy or potential 
enemy” and sensitivity toward purposefulness in the thinking of Others (Carr 1964 [1939]:71-72). 
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contains a latent temporal foundation that is the basis of its understanding of human 
behavior in general and politics in particular. 
 
 




 Theoretical affinities between constructivism and classical realism are not limited 
to their shared view of temporality, and the possibility of synthesizing the two has 
already been broached (Barkin 2003, 2004, Jackson and Nexon 2004, Lebow 2004, 
Mattern 2004, Sterling-Folker 2004). I will not treat this possibility extensively here, 
except to offer an alternative, based on an additional temporal link between the two 
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movements, to J. Samuel Barkin’s conclusion that the appropriate combination of the two 
concepts is “realist constructivism” (2003:336). Turning to Reinhold Niebuhr’s critique of 
domestic political power indicates that constructivist realism is also possible. 
 In this critique, Niebuhr critically anticipates Baert’s maintenance-based self-
reflection in a manner reliant on constructivist principles. Niebuhr founds the ability of 
the nation to compel and inspire allegiance (and bloodshed) on “the panoply and ritual of 
the state” and “the symbols of unity and greatness, which inspire awe and reverence in 
the citizen. . . . Thus the sentiment of patriotism achieves a potency in the modern soul, 
so unqualified, that the nation is given carte blanche to use the power . . . for any purpose 
it desires” (2001 [1932]:92). Niebuhr leaves unanswered how ritual and symbolism lead to 
awe, reverence, or patriotism. The reader can only accept or reject that the former inspire 
the latter prima facie.  
 Constructivism fills in the middle of Niebuhr’s equation by examining social 
groups’ “dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of [a] material world” 
presented by political elites to compel their allegiance (Adler 1997:322).68 Without shared 
understandings, rituals and panoplies are impotent. But when combined with the “ethical 
paradox in patriotism . . . which transmutes individual unselfishness into national egoism” 
(Niebuhr 2001 [1932]:91), these shared understandings allow symbolic performances to 
                                                 
68 Likewise, constructivism can provide the mechanism(s) behind Morgenthau’s typology of 
political power which, while robust, is not without theoretical lacunae. Morgenthau conceives 
political power as “a psychological relation” derived from three sources: “the expectation of 
benefits, the fear of disadvantages, the respect or love for men [sic] or institutions” (1993 
[1948]:30).  
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resonate and thus bolster collective sentiments. Crucially for Niebuhr, these multiple 
levers of power not only contribute positively to political capabilities, but also aid elites in 
“thwarting” dissent as a threat to domestic unity: 
 
“So nations crucify their moral rebels with their criminals upon the same Golgotha, 
not being able to distinguish between the moral idealism which surpasses, and the 
anti-social conduct which falls below that moral mediocrity, on the level of which 
every society unifies its life. . . . It is . . . probably inevitable that every society should 
regard criticism as a proof of want of loyalty” (Niebuhr 2001 [1932]:88-89). 
 
 Baert observes that self-reflection can lead not only to social change, but also to 
intentional maintenance of the existing organizational structure. In Niebuhr’s case, elites 
who reflect on the underlying organizational processes of the nation-state may be 
inclined to engage in a form of maintenance by rhetorically discouraging public discourse 
that could expose the contingency of those processes, and by implication, the state itself. 
Thus, Niebuhr discovers the potential for systematic abuse of temporality inherent in the 
modern nation-state. This abuse is facilitated through elites’ understandings of the 
knowledge structures that are “continually constituted and reproduced” by a political 
community (Adler 1997:326-27), which is the collective manifestation of temporalized 
sociology. Thus, Baert’s ideas about public discourse as collective self-reflection and his 
understanding of first order self-reflection as behavior intended to instantiate an outcome 
within an established social structure can contribute much to studies of how governments 
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mobilize popular support at home. It can also speak to the topic of how those same 
governments legitimate their actions abroad.69 
 Barkin claims that the appropriate synthesis of constructivism and realism is a 
“realist constructivism”, in which hard-headed realism dissociates constructivism from 
liberal-idealism (2003:338).70 An understanding of the temporal differences between 
liberal-idealism and constructivism (other than Wendt’s) exposes Barkin’s proposal as 
logically unnecessary—constructivists are in no way necessarily liberal-idealists (Steele 
2007a:26-30). By contrast, a constructivist realism is appropriate in that constructivism’s 
concern with intersubjectivity and social meaning can expose the inner workings of many 
of the phenomena that realists attack.71 Two of these phenomena are the mobilization of 
support and the disciplining of dissent, both of which link constructivist understanding to 
                                                 
69 This in no way means that constructivism and temporalized sociology are merely tools for 
exploiting populaces and rationalizing actions. For instance, disputes regarding the legitimacy of 
use of force can be either maintenance-based (as in the case of the U.N.-supported right to self-
defense) or transformative (as in the case of the extent and quality of human rights) with regard to 
international social norms. For coverage of both options, see (Wheeler 2000). 
70 In the forum on Barkin’s article, Jackson and Nexson accuse him of actually proposing a 
“constructivist realism—a realism that takes norms and ideas seriously as objects of 
analysis”(2004:338). To this, they offer their own version of “realist-constructivism—a 
constructivism that involves a self-consistent set of arguments about why power cannot be, in any 
way, transcended in international politics” (Jackson and Nexon 2004:338). While Jackson’s and 
Nexson’s proposal for a realist-constructivism is an improvement on Barkin’s essentially non-
idealist constructivism, their reading of Barkin is only salient if it is accepted that realism did not 
previously (or originally) take norms and ideas seriously and was instead a “commitment to 
understanding the social world as a result of natural necessity” (Jackson and Nexon 2004:338), a 
charge more appropriate to neorealism than classical realism. 
71 This is somewhat akin to the general approach adopted by Lebow in the forum (2004), although 
the focus here on time is distinct. 
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realist critiques through Baert’s temporally based, pragmatic self-reflection. Thus, time 
provides the bond to the constructivist realist synthesis.  
 
Conclusion: unseen by God, championed by humans 
 This chapter endeavored to demonstrate the relevance of time to extant IR theory. 
I mobilized a pragmatic and process oriented understanding of temporality to typologize 
and critique several theoretical movements, and concluded by proposing a corrected 
theoretical synthesis. The next chapter complements this one by exploring another 
dormant synthesis—that of territorial state sovereignty and Western standard time. As a 
stepping stone to that effort, and to its genealogical intent, I return to Adler’s discussion 
of the social character of knowledge. Recall that intersubjective knowledge has 
ontological status because of the 
 
‘collective intentional imposition of function on entities that cannot perform those 
functions without that imposition’. Thus, God could not see money or private 
property. Instead he would see ‘us treating certain objects’ as money and private 
property. In other words . . . ‘there are portions of the real world, objective facts in 
the world, that are only facts by human agreement (Adler 1997:328). 
 
In what follows I will argue that God could not see time or sovereignty, either. Instead, 
God would see humans mechanically reckoning arbitrary subdivisions of a rationalized 
solar day on the one hand, the earth’s territory on the other, and treating those 
subdivisions as having a functionality that really exists only through social agreement. I 
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will also argue that, unlike sovereignty, the uncontested globalization of time has allowed 
us to forget the intrinsic contingency of its social nature, to the detriment of international 





The ascendancy of Western standard time and territorial state sovereignty 
 
 
Even our most enduring institutions are based on collective understandings; . . . they are reified 
structures that were once upon a time conceived ex nihilo by human consciousness; and . . . these 
understandings were subsequently diffused and consolidated until they were taken for granted. 
 –Emanuel Adler 
 
Rather like one . . . in whose ear the clock has just thundered with all its force its twelve strokes of 
noon, suddenly wakes up, and asks himself, ‘What has in point of fact just struck?’ so do we at 
times . . . ask in complete astonishment and complete embarrassment, ‘Through what have we in 
point of fact just lived?’ 




 In the previous chapter, I asserted that a temporal lens can be useful in critiquing 
IR theory. I offer now a genealogical historical sketch of the interwoven developments of 
Western standard time and territorial state sovereignty. The purposes of this chapter are 
twofold. First, as an empirical complement to the previous chapter, the general aim in 
linking modern temporality to state sovereignty is to elevate the relevance of time to IR 
and to support a stance that the modern arrangement of international affairs has 
important spatial and temporal components. In his seminal account of the development of 
clocks and modernity, David Landes calls the mechanical timepiece “one of the great 
inventions in the history of mankind—not in the same class as fire and the wheel, but 
comparable to movable type in its revolutionary implications for cultural values, 
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technological change, social and political organization, and personality” (2000:6). 
However, viewed from the position of the IR canon, a history of time and sovereignty 
represents an unequal yoking. Sovereignty is accepted as a constitutive element of the 
modern international system, whereas standardized time remains a feature peripheral to 
world politics. Contra this view I argue that, like its sovereign spatial sibling, the 
emergence of the contemporary method of reckoning time was an important factor in the 
rise of political modernity, and thus critical to studies of international relations. Second, 
as indicated by the genealogical modifier discussed earlier, this history seeks to 
denaturalize the time wrought by modernity as a step toward uncovering the relations of 
power in which modern time is involved. 
 The chapter begins with a preliminary discussion of terms. I then draw 
conceptual connections between Enlightenment epistemological trends and the rational, 
abstract organization of sovereignty and time, arguing that both territorially organized 
polities and abstract temporal units and mechanisms belong to a cosmopolitical image of 
modernity predicated upon a belief in the philosophical affinities between natural 
(physical) and social organizing principles. The remainder of the chapter is divided into 
three sections corresponding to the conception of Western time in Europe, its diffusion 
around the world, and its standardization as a global social institution. 
 In order to demonstrate the imbrication of temporality and spatiality during the 
rise of the modern international system, in each section I locate ‘sites’ of the emergence of 
territorial state sovereignty and explicate contemporaneous processes and events 
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implicated in the rise of Western standard time at those sites. Essentially, I am arguing for 
the coeval rise of modern space and time by showing that both developed in the same 
places at the same times. The sites are: churches, cities, factories, ships, railroads and 
telegraphs, colonies, the trenches of World War I, and postcolonial nation-states. While 
the literature on sovereignty is substantial,72 I have tried to choose sites common to many 
accounts so as to avoid detouring into debates regarding specific hypotheses about 
sovereignty’s emergence and establishment as a modern world political organizing 
principle. One such example is the eminence of the 1648 treaties of Westphalia, whose 
status fluctuate between marking the “origin” of modern international society (Philpott 
2001:75-96) and amounting to a “myth” of mainstream IR (Teschke 2003). Instead, by 
aiming for breadth, I can demonstrate that modern temporality is relevant to the general 
question of how the modern international system came to be organized as it is. By 
revealing the importance of time in the spaces of sovereignty, I advocate for an infusion 
of time into IR. 
 
Terms 
 Before proceeding any further, I must clarify three terms that feature prominently 
in the subsequent discussions. First, when referring to modernity, I take an inclusive—if 
Eurocentric—approach that deems ideas and technologies even loosely associated with 
                                                 
72 At a glance, (Herz 1957, Falk 1981, Kratochwil 1986, Ruggie 1986, Jackson 1990, Toulmin 1990, 
Onuf 1991, Ruggie 1993, Walker 1993, Spruyt 1994, Bartelson 1995, Weber 1995, Biersteker and 
Weber 1996, Ruggie 1998, Hall 1999, Krasner 1999, 2001, Philpott 2001, Teschke 2003). 
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the Renaissance, Enlightenment, and later historical periods as ‘modern’.73  Thus, the 
‘modern era’ refers to the time period from the thirteenth century to present. This 
includes what might be considered the late medieval era, but in terms of Western 
standard time and territorial state sovereignty, the late medieval is better understood as 
premodernity, since the roots of both concepts reach back at least to the thirteenth 
century (Landes 2000:48, Philpott 2001:16n7).74 
 Second, when referring to territorial state sovereignty, or modern sovereignty, I 
adopt an understanding based on “internal hierarchy and external autonomy” (Spruyt 
1994:3)—the division of the earth’s “land surface . . . into discrete territorial units, each 
with a government that exercises substantial authority within its own territory” (Murphy 
1996:81 emphasis added). This understanding requires neither “supreme” domestic 
authority (Philpott 2001:16) nor internal monopolization of violence (Teschke 2003:2-3) 
and it elides, for the most part, important discussions of mutual recognition by like units 
                                                 
73 For a discussion of what modernity and the modern age includes and excludes, see (Toulmin 
1990:7-13). I do not distinguish between modern and postmodern in this chapter. The importance 
of postmodern thinking about the spatial and temporal aspects of IR will become apparent in the 
next chapter. For now, it is a discussion that I bracket in order to preserve momentum toward a 
general spatio-temporal image of international relations. For an excellent account of ‘modern’ 
thinking, the responses of ‘postmodern’ theorists, and the implications of both for IR and political 
theory, see (Rengger 1995). 
74 Although he remarks, “Not until the fourteenth century do we get our first unmistakable reports 
of mechanical clocks”, Landes also discusses “legend and speculation” about the rise of mechanical 
timekeeping as dating back to the turn of the millennium (2000:48). Skeptics may criticize such a 
liberal historical window, but my investigation is premised on the belief that, while a more 
rigorous and nuanced understanding of the modern age may not incorporate as large a window, 
the processes visible through that window have been a long time coming. 
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(Strang 1996:22-3).75 Much as in the proposed meaning of modernity, these omissions 
facilitate argumentation by subsuming nuance to relevance. 
 Third, by Western time, modern time, or clock time I am referring to the time 
now commonly associated with contemporary clocks and watches, a form of reckoning 
based on the “continuous indication of equal hours” abstracted from celestial motions 
(Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:282).76  In modern daily life, hours are further subdivided into 
minutes and seconds, producing a unified, elegant, rational manner of marking daylight 
that is, in reality, highly variegated depending on one’s earthly and seasonal location. The 
modifier ‘Western’ refers to the distinctly European, and later North American, roots and 
impulses of this form of time reckoning. Alternate time conventions existed in non-
European cultures before and after the development of clock time, and most certainly 
persist in some cultures today. However only the Western version of standardized 
reckoning achieved a global hegemony—we do not currently coordinate our temporal 
lives by global time zones based on the Chinese or Islamic clepsydrae (water clocks, see 
Landes 2000:7,21-22), or by ancient sundials—so it will be my sole concern now. A final 
                                                 
75 Yet another understanding of modern sovereignty is based on the idea of “separate, 
independent . . . states, each of them organized around a particular nation” (Toulmin 1990:7 
emphasis added). The restrictiveness of this understanding is exposed by Hall’s more complex and 
dynamic rendering which distinguishes between dynastic, territorial, and national forms of 
sovereignty within the same general period (1999). 
76 Landes counts the common mechanism of modern time reckoning as some “oscillatory device 
[that] tracks the passing moments; it is what the Germans call a Zeitnormal, or time standard . . . It 
beats time” (2000:8). 
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modifier, ‘standard’ or ‘standardized’, appears in passages referring to the global 
institutionalization of Western, modern, clock time.77 
 
Enlightenment epistemology and cosmopolitics 
 Before turning to the sites of the dual rise of territorial state sovereignty and 
Western standard time, I want to adumbrate their shared Enlightenment lineage by 
pointing out the conceptual affinities between them. The attention given to territorial 
state sovereignty often applies equally well to modern time. In his critique of 
sovereignty’s reification in IR, Walker claims that “As a practice of states, [sovereignty] is 
easily mistaken for their essence” (1991:458). Rediscovering Western time’s historical 
specificity as a reckoning convention (Adam 2004:112-13) suggests that it is also a practice 
that is easily mistaken for the essence of its object. Walker goes on to point out that “As a 
category of analysis, [sovereignty] is easily treated as the silent condition guaranteeing all 
other categories” (1991:458). The same is true of modern time in political science, 
especially that of the quantitative variety. In this way, modern time reflects an 
                                                 
77 In this chapter, Western standard time does not include calendrical time. Historically, calendars 
have undergone extensive rationalization and standardization efforts (Adam 2004, Zerubavel 1977, 
1982a, 1982b, 1985, 2003), but today lunar and solar calendars coexist in many cultures such as 
Japan, where official documents are dated from the year of the current Emperor’s ascension 
alongside the BCE-CE convention. For this reason, as well as limited pages, and by way of 
bracketing calendar time, I will only remark that the rise of territorial sovereign states produced 
and was produced in part by increased interests and abilities in controlling all of the manners of 
time reckoning of their populaces, from clock time to calendar time. A cross-cultural historical 
comparison of calendrical practices would likely yield further insights into the complex 
relationship between political power and time reckoning, including a connection between 
conceptualizations of temporality and authority relations. 
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Enlightenment tendency to “conceal” or “hide” the origins of epistemological practices, 
which began as propositions among alternatives and attained efficacy only through social 
argumentation and agreement (Edkins 1999:2). 
 But Enlightenment epistemology contributes much more than reification. It is 
primarily responsible for the germination of the spatial and temporal propositions that 
currently predominate. Modern sovereignty and time both represent highly ‘rational’ 
images of social organization. In the case of sovereignty, the multitude of peoples and 
cultures around the world are organized by the discrete partitioning of the earth’s land 
into self-contained units. In the case of time, a highly nebulous, intuitive concept is 
explicitly described via the discrete partitioning of abstracted averages of celestial motions. 
Both display a seventeenth century Cartesian faith in a unified natural structure that 
privileges permanence over contingency, certainty over skepticism, and theoretically 
rigorous covering laws over conclusions derived from case-based inquiries (Toulmin 
1990:34).78  
 In the seventeenth century, such preferences represented an attempt to introduce 
to virulent ideological competitions an alternative system of assessment that would 
delimit debates in such a way as to preclude their ultimate settlement on the battlefield. 
The Thirty Years’ War threatened Europe with ruin, and philosophers such as Descartes 
believed that changing the nature and process of foundational debates was the only way 
                                                 
78 Toulmin refers to this shift in preferences as the process by which philosophy became “timeless” 
(1990:34). 
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to limit symptomatic political violence. In lieu of appeals to lineage, Church doctrine, or 
religious texts, Enlightenment philosophers substituted materialism (the ontological 
privilege of physical matter), empiricism (the sensory limitation of epistemology), and 
Reason (the epistemological privilege of self-evident propositions).79 If a claim could not 
be ascertained through the examination of physical nature, or through rigorous logic,80 it 
became invalid as a philosophical and political topic. Williams describes these boundaries 
as “epistemic ethical practices” that constituted “a negative ontology . . . in the name of 
opposing innatist ontologies of privilege and traditional authority” (2007:14). Such 
delimitations further championed “abstract universality” over particularity so that 
“political violence was . . . removed from the private or personal realm and the public, 
political realm was . . . insulated from personal acts of violence” (Williams 2007:16,  see 
also Toulmin 1990:80). 
 The rise of the modern state is often associated with the secularization of politics, 
and discussions of moves away from innatism certainly seem to support such a claim. 
However, Stephen Toulmin argues that rationalism was not so much a removal of religion 
and tradition from philosophy and politics as it was a new version of “Cosmopolis”, the 
idea that the order of the cosmos (nature) and the polis (society) emanate from a single, 
                                                 
79 Empiricism and Reason seem to oppose each other in that the former relies on experience and 
the latter relies on context-less propositions. I include them here because they both oppose “the 
various forms of innatism and essentialism” that had led to persistent religio-political violence in 
Europe (Williams 2007:14), and because they both hold implications for the attractiveness of 
modern clock time. 
80 Toulmin refers to this as the prioritization of “epistemological proofs” over religious doctrine 
(1990:30). 
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fundamental source (1990:67). During the wars of the Reformation and Counter-
Reformation, European society nearly collapsed, compelling a search for a more 
convincing basis for social order understood through the lens of the natural sciences, so 
that “the structure of Nature reinforces a rational Social Order” (Toulmin 1990:68). As the 
cosmos was being more and more accurately described by the “causal necessity” of 
mechanical processes, so could the polis be stabilized by grafting “enticing new analogies” 
from those processes into social and political thought (Toulmin 1990:107).  
 One of these analogies was the “geometrical certainty” (Toulmin 1990:62) 
achieved by territorial partition of political authority. But a more compelling illustration 
from that era exposes the importance of rationalized time to the rise of modernity. Since 
the modern version of cosmopolitical thinking retained the idea of “treating natural 
systems like the planetary system as templates for social systems” (Toulmin 1990:114), 
images of the organization of the cosmos exerted great influence—so much so that an 
image of the “State as modeled on the solar system dominated the imagination of 
respectable Europeans and Americans for generations” (Toulmin 1990:127). During the 
Enlightenment, the ascendant image of the celestial realm was that of a “cosmic 
clockwork” (Toulmin 1990:108), indicating that the analogy of the mechanical timepiece 
provided the essential link between nature and society in the emerging cosmopolitical 
system.81 For those “who reconstructed European society and culture after the Thirty 
                                                 
81 While vertical, hierarchical visions of domestic authority coexist with horizontal, autonomous 
relations between states in most accounts, Toulmin uses the clockwork metaphor to give an orbital 
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Years’ War . . . it was important to believe that the principles of stability and hierarchy 
were found in all of the Divine plan, down from the astronomical cosmos to the 
individual family” (Toulmin 1990:128).82 Obviously, this included the rational ordering 
achieved by territorial state sovereignty. What is less obvious, but conceptually prior, is 
that the Divine plan was understood by the metaphor of the mechanical clock, an image 
that would not have been convincing absent the increasing consistency and accuracy—
the rationality—of modern time reckoning. Rationalism’s greatest social theoretical 
achievement may have been imagining politics spatially in order to reduce conflicts of 
authority, but it was a temporal vision that provided the inspiration. 
 
Time bred: the birth of modern temporality and spatiality in Western Europe 
 In this section, I examine three sites where modern sovereignty arose and find a 
common interest among them in modern time reckoning techniques and concepts. The 
first two sites, churches and cities, laid the groundwork both temporally and spatially for 
the emergence of modern modes of social organization exemplified in the third site, the 
factory. As with all the sites to follow, there are admitted historical overlaps between 
                                                                                                                                           
explication of the modern nation-state: “the Roi Soleil, or Solar King, wields authority over 
successive circles of subjects, all of whom know their places, and keep their proper orbits” 
(1990:127). This description overlaps with world systems theory accounts of the international 
system as constituted by a core, semi-periphery, and periphery. Interestingly, such accounts 
recognize their debt to an iconic rationalist, Karl Marx, but pay little homage to the cosmopolitical 
roots underpinning his philosophy. 
82 The Enlightenment version of Cosmopolis argues against a secularized state because it retains the 
belief that “Everything in the natural order testifies to God’s dominion over Nature. That 
dominion extends through the entire fabric of the world, natural or human, and is apparent on 
every level of experience” (Toulmin 1990:127). 
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churches, cities, and factories. However, I will point out some historically sequential 
relationship between each site and the next in order to move the story along and to 
accentuate common themes running through it. 
 
Churches 
 Despite the tangled ligatures of feudalism that often subjected a person or 
territory to multiple claims of obligation based on religious, secular, or personal bonds 
(Spruyt 1994:36), medieval time emanated from a single source. Combined with a general 
indifference to time in daily, secular life, the efforts of the Roman Catholic Church83 to 
ensure orderly religious observance resulted in a common view of time as belonging to 
God alone, ciphered solely by scriptural revelation, and associated primarily with the 
afterlife. The Church alone “kept the day and times of year, it told people which days 
were holy and which not, it determined when to work and when not to” (Spruyt 1994:70). 
Daniel Philpott makes the counterfactual claim that modern sovereignty would not have 
emerged when it did without the challenge of “Protestant propositions” to the Church’s 
predominance, the violent responses of the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire, and the 
resulting alliances between kings and religious pluralists against the Catholics (2001:23-
50). These alliances typically led to an increase in secular authority and the eventual 
impotence of ecclesiastical claims within territorial realms. Philpott discusses the “Janus-
faced” nature of the new sovereign states, staring “inward” at their subjects and “outward” 
                                                 
83 Any references to the Church denote the Roman Catholic variety. 
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at a world of equals devoid of “robed ecclesiasts who claim temporal authority84 within 
their borders” (2001:18). Concomitant with this revolution in authority was the de-
monopolization of time. 
 However, the time that secular authorities wrested from the Church’s grasp was 
already rationalized and abstracted in two important ways. First, time had already come 
to be viewed as a commodity, in large part due to monastic communities. The monks’ 
vocation “was to pray and pray often” (Landes 2000:55), but they also had to keep 
monasteries functioning on a daily basis. In order to ensure a balance between the sacred 
and the mundane, “canonical hours” dictated a specific number of services each day as 
well the times of their observance (Landes 2000:56). As more services were added, the 
longstanding habit of dividing the day into quarters became inadequate (Landes 
2000:54).85 Thus, the celestially determined day was increasingly subdivided to enable 
religious observance, and the usage of time came to be understood as a form of worship—
                                                 
84 The phrase “temporal authority” plays a short role in studies of sovereignty. Philpott uses it to 
convey secular offices and powers held by the Church (2001:18,33), and mentions the rise of 
German sovereigns as being linked to the end of “the involvement of the Church in temporal 
affairs” (2001:86). This decline occasioned a vigorous reaction from the Church: “Sensing the 
defeat of universal Catholic temporal authority, [Pope Innocent X] issued a bull, Zel Domus, 
condemning the treaties [of Westphalia] as ‘null, void, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, damnable, 
reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect for all time’ ” (Philpott 2001:87). However, as 
modern sovereignty emerges in the accounts used in this chapter, “temporal authority” disappears. 
This may be due to its association with the Church’s interference in secular affairs so that, as the 
Church declined in world politics, it took with it the distinction between eternal and temporal 
authority. One result of this disappearance has been an effect of timelessness in the current 
arrangements of political (temporal) authority, an effect this study seeks to expose. 
85 This convention dates back at least to the early third century, when Tertullian recommended 
that, in addition to the morning (sunrise) and evening (sunset) prayers, “there would be devotions 
at the third, sixth and ninth hours” (Landes 2000:54). 
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the good monk attended to his duties in such a way as to maximize the amount of the day 
he could devote to prayer. Thus, the subdivision of the monastic day encouraged a 
commodified view of time. This view was extended to the secular realm, becoming 
“axiomatic” by the early twelfth century, when the “churchman and political thinker” 
John of Salisbury wrote that nothing was more “unworthy . . . than the man who wastes 
time—this precious time, the one thing you can’t get back once you lose it. The man who, 
wasting time, wastes his own life . . . dishonors himself” (Landes 2000:58). In this critique 
can be found an early association of productivity with virtue, a connection later 
institutionalized in, among other places, modern industrial capitalist factories. 
 Second, and in support of the commodified view, Church time reckoning was 
accomplished with the assistance of mechanical invention. By the end of the thirteenth 
century, mechanical timekeepers were an established item in cathedral accounts (Landes 
2000:51).86 While the development of various types of measuring devices had been 
ongoing for centuries, Landes argues that this period marks the ascension of the 
mechanical reckoning device because churches spent large amounts to construct them, 
and because their attachment to bells to signal the hours to observers necessitated that 
                                                 
86 The long, labyrinthine, highly technical history of mechanical timekeeping defies all but the 
most basic generalization. In this context, mechanical timekeeping marks the distinction between, 
on the one hand, devices with no moving parts (sundial) or devices that relied on an exhaustible 
material (water or sand) for their impulse, and on the other hand, devices that stored human 
energy in moving parts (gears, springs, etc). Histories of the development of mechanical 
timekeeping include (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996, Landes 2000, Cipolla 2003, and to a lesser extent, 
Mooij 2005). O’Malley offers an account of the commercial aspects of mechanical clocks that 
includes a fascinating discussion of the association of standard time with social surveillance and 
discipline in the US (1990). 
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they be placed “in high places—the better to hear them” (Landes 2000:51). Older 
reckoning devices such as water clocks were unsuitable for tower placement since “no 
one hauls water any higher than he has to” (Landes 2000:51);87 smaller and lighter 
mechanical clocks were the solution, and they began to appear atop church towers during 
the fourteenth century (Landes 2000:48). An important corollary of this argument is 
Landes’ observation that rationalizing and abstracting “sensibilities preceded the 
invention of the mechanical clock; indeed helped create the need and gave birth to its 
realization” (2000:58).88 
 Thus, the existing temporal knowledge that sovereigns annexed from the Church 
was of a particular character that anticipated the abstract, rationalizing tendencies of 
modernity. As I will argue during the rest of this chapter, struggles over temporal 
authority did not involve questions about the nature of temporality itself, and thus served 
to reproduce and refine it rather than challenge or alter it. Modern temporality in turn 
helped to produce particular modes of social life. The roots of modern sovereignty trace 
back to conflicts over secular-religious authority relationships, and the roots of modern 
time can be found in religious authority. A largely unacknowledged result of those 
struggles was the export of commodified, mechanized time from the religious to the 
                                                 
87 In addition, a “tower is no place for a water clock” because “lofty exposures make it very difficult 
to keep water from cooling and freezing” (Landes 2000:51). 
88 Thus, temporal knowledge was one of the few aspects of medieval European science that 
flourished rather than receded (Landes 2000:59). 
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secular realms, manifested in the rise of cities in early modern Europe, where tower 
clocks and commodified views of time became increasingly prevalent. 
 
Cities 
 Territorially delineated cities, and later city-states, were important antecedents to 
the modern state because, as an alternative to the cross-cutting jurisdictions of the 
medieval period (Spruyt 1994:36), they provided an example of a unified polity ruled by a 
distinct authority (Philpott 2001:14, Spruyt 1994:149).89 As discussed above, Protestantism 
provided a crucial impetus to political change by challenging Catholic authority (Philpott 
2001:125), but Protestantism was also significantly related to the rise of urban life. 
Philpott argues that the growing urban commercial class displayed an “elective affinity” 
for Protestant propositions in that higher literacy rates and a burgeoning sense of 
“administrative autonomy” predisposed urban populations to embrace challenges to 
Church and imperial authority, in contrast to rural areas where Protestantism “took root 
the least” (2001:145-46). Although cities eventually gave way to sovereign states as the 
dominant mode of political authority, Hendrik Spruyt argues that city-states displayed 
important features of modern sovereignty: “the city-state developed notions of 
                                                 
89 Spruyt claims that city-states and city-leagues represented a significant challenge to the Church, 
the Holy Roman Empire, and feudal obligations as early as 1300 (1994:36). 
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sovereignty and the public realm. . . . And like the sovereign state, the city-state had 
territorial borders” (1994:150).90 
 Compared to their role in the development of modern sovereignty, cities were 
even more central in the development of modern time. Borrowing directly from the 
Church, cities relied on a commodified view of time and on mechanical tower clocks for 
much of their daily social organization. In contrast to rural consciousness, which merely 
“received” or “perceived” time, urban consciousness “tracked” and “used” time itself 
(Landes 2000:76).91 To the emerging middle class “Time was no longer the ephemeral time 
of the afterlife” (Spruyt 1994:74). The bourgeoisie had cultivated its sociopolitical 
relevance by acquiring wealth through commerce and trade, and such activities “required 
formalized calculation of time” as well as a common, commodified understanding of 
time’s passage. Whereas medieval time had belonged to God alone, urban businessmen 
utilized “mathematical precision” to calculate interest rates on loans based on the belief 
that “time itself had value” (Spruyt 1994:74). Altered time consciousness was essential to 
the urban challenge to Church authority: “Throughout Western Europe towns 
constructed clock towers which were strategically placed opposite belfries of the 
churches” (Spruyt 1994:74), offering to city life new sources of daily order. Crucially, 
                                                 
90 Importantly, Philpott claims that Italian city-states “did nothing to bring about” the sovereign 
system of states because they remained Catholic polities and were therefore not predisposed to 
Protestantism (2001:21). However, Spruyt places Italian city-states within the broader historical 
momentum toward modern sovereignty as an important early alternative to feudalism (1994:130-
50). 
91 Landes’ comment typifies his “functionalist” account of cities and the rise of modernity, but 
should not be confused with the claim that cities intrinsically “desired” modernity or modern time 
(Hanson 1997:7). 
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such alternatives challenged only the Church’s temporal authority, not the authority of 
Church temporality. “[T]he rulers of Europe seized upon and delighted in the new bell-
ringing clocks . . . costly to build and maintain, but well worth it for their plangent 
ubiquity—the ideal, quotidian reminder and symbol of high authority” (Landes 2000:75). 
High authority was viewed as emanating from the constructor rather than the 
construction of time. Nevertheless, by wresting the right to mark time from the Church, 
the mechanized calculation of city time contributed to the overall rationalization of social 
and business activities that helped carve out an urban niche in the emerging modern 
social order.92 
 The temporal transformation in fourteenth century social life that rationalizing 
and standardizing efforts wrought cannot be overestimated. Whereas the daily life of the 
rural peasant was defined solely by the sun, city time was “man-made . . . an invitation to 
serial engagements: with careful planning (that is, timing), one can multiply oneself” 
(Landes 2000:75). In municipalities, serial engagements both facilitated and responded to 
an expanding array of services and opportunities available to urban populations. As 
Dorhn-van Rossum explicates, municipal governments and citizenries bore much of the 
responsibility for a “growing flood of deliberative and decision-making processes” 
epitomized by burdensome committee, court, and guild participation, all regulated by the 
new tower clocks and bells (1996:237). As responsibilities increased, temporal 
                                                 
92 Such rationalized alternatives to medieval practices are epitomized by the urban institution of 
standardized and predictable taxation as a replacement for the arbitrary revenue extraction 
practiced under feudalism (Spruyt 1994:89,163). 
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rationalizing techniques further subdivided the urban day, and vice versa. But “What 
appears in retrospect as a long-term development toward greater temporal precision 
amounted within the purview of contemporary experience above all to many steps of 
abstraction . . . away from the natural system of reference” (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:239). 
Such abstraction held the kernel of the idea of compartmentalization endemic to modern, 
urban life—multiplying oneself implies adopting different roles in different contexts at 
different times. 
 Not only did citizens increasingly engage in the clock-driven life of the city. They 
also began to have their working lives regulated by a commodified, calculated time 
consciousness. For example, by the late fourteenth century statutes for day laborers and 
artisans alike were based not on sunrise and sunset but on specific points on the tower 
clock face (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:234-35). The new time regulations “were uniformly 
restrictive in nature, that is to say, they determined, for reasons of competition and 
quality safeguards, the maximum amount of working time permitted” (Dohrn-van 
Rossum 1996:235).93 In an interesting twist, whereas commodified time had helped John 
                                                 
93 These restrictions were widespread and quite comprehensive. By way of examples, the following 
lengthy passage is indicative: “Weavers of fustian, armorers, and pursemakers could not begin 
before five in the morning and could work at the very most until nine in the evening. 
Coppersmiths and needlemakers had to stop at eight o’clock. Joiners (chestmakers) were allowed to 
work from four until eight, felt hat makers from four until ten”. Smiths “could start at eight o’clock 
in the morning” but “had to cease working as early as five”. Seasonal and weekly variations were 
also accounted for: “Only during winter could [belt makers] continue by candlelight until nine. . . . 
On Saturdays and on evenings preceding high holidays, belt makers had to stop at four, 
needlemakers and smiths in the winter at four, in the summer at six and seven, respectively. 
Tailors who worked past eight o’clock on evenings preceding feast days had to pay penance of one 
pound of wax”(Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:235). 
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of Salisbury to turn productivity into a virtue, it now served the purpose of constraining 
that work ethic. In this way, modern temporality was both the creator and master of 
modern labor. Social control based on time was made possible in two new ways afforded 
by the ever-growing precision and consistency of mechanical clocks. First, “events, whose 
previous temporal determination was vague or nonexistent”, were “fixed on a temporal 
axis”, as in the case of market hours of operation, a term suggestive of the change (Dohrn-
van Rossum 1996:236). Second, the concept of duration in social and commercial 
activities was revolutionized in that requiring a maximum or minimum length of time to 
those activities was made possible by the presupposition of “abstract times that are always 
of equal length” (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:236). 
 The increasingly autonomous urban bourgeoisie welcomed political bargains 
offered by such kings as France’s Louis IX and Henri IV that included a “legal framework 
and ideological legitimation” based on territorial boundaries and “an exact locus of 
authority” instead of medieval cross-cutting (Spruyt 1994:105), bolstering the momentum 
of territorial sovereignty. Prior to these bargains, such bourgeois self-sufficiency was 
facilitated in part by constructing secular tower clocks that offered an alternative marker 
but similar mode of time reckoning to that of the Church, whose commodified and 
rationalized understanding of time was well-suited to the development of commerce and 
abstraction of daily life upon which urban vitality relied. As a result of the appropriation 
of Church time, social and commercial relations became more predictable, but such 
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acclimation was not accomplished without conflict. Nowhere was this conflict more 
apparent than in labor relations, in particular disputes in the urban, modern factory. 
 
Factories 
 Capitalism, here emblematized by the industrial factory, is a nearly ubiquitous 
component of conventional accounts of the rise of territorial state sovereignty (Walker 
1991:450).94 Wallerstein explains the existence of the sovereign states system as part of a 
“unilinear” process related to capital in general, and specifically a response to the “needs 
of class forces operating in the world economy”, an argument whose causal relationship 
Spruyt reverses without challenging the fundamental connection between the two 
(1994:18-19).95 Rodney Bruce Hall goes as far as to claim that modern states that 
accomplish the Janus-faced task of  providing a “favorable forum” for citizenship while 
competing well internationally are linked significantly by their ability to “provide 
favorable forums of capitalist production” (1999:21), and that the dominant unit in 
international affairs is the specifically modern, capitalist, nation-state (1999:22).96 
                                                 
94 The conventional account traces the roots of the territorial, capitalist, nation-state back through 
the Renaissance to feudalism, to the age of empires (especially Roman), to the Greek city-states, 
and finally to primitive tribes, in an effort to traditionalize and naturalize the modern sovereign 
state (Walker 1991:450). 
95 Spruyt also explains the division of labor on which capitalism is based as partially due to the rise 
of cities, arguing that as villages grew into towns, and towns grew into territorially distinct cities, 
revenues were best-maximized by specialization of labor (1994:62). 
96 The crux of Hall’s argument is that surplus capital simultaneously encourages the sustenance of 
the state, civil society, and individual citizens (1999:22). 
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 Clearly, it is not easy to imagine the historical rise of modern sovereignty without 
the presence of capitalism. It is even more difficult to imagine capitalism, especially as 
embodied in factory life, without a commodified understanding of time and the 
controlling presence of a common, mechanical, signaling clock. Giddens contends that 
this understanding of time “is surely one of the most distinctive features of modern 
capitalism” (1984:144). Furthermore, Landes argues that the rise of modern time 
consciousness encouraged the industrial revolution by exposing a conflict in the 
eighteenth century between the traditional putting-out system, in which rural and 
cottage workers operated unbound by any time other than sunrise and sunset,97 and 
owners/employers, who had adopted a sense of time-as-commodity. The perception of 
profits lost by the employers due to the poor efficiency of the dispersed labor force could 
only be reconciled by “bringing the workers together in a place where the employer 
could directly oversee their performance” (Landes 2000:240).  
 Just as in the monastic day98 and in city commerce, during the industrial 
revolution “the importance of a rational economic use of time and the new forms of time 
discipline99 moved to the forefront of public interest. Mechanization of production, [and] 
                                                 
97 Labor time in the putting-out system is known as “task orientation”. For a discussion of the 
putting-out system as well as the shift from rural to factory time consciousness, see (Thompson 
1967:60,71-79). 
98 Mumford connects monasticism and capitalism more directly, calling the Benedictines the 
founders of modern capitalism because they gave “human enterprise the regular collective beat and 
rhythm of the machine” (quoted in Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:34). 
99 “Time-discipline” here is in the sense of external control of factory workers based on time, a 
usage generalized fairly consistently across the literature. However, Adam proposes a more useful 
distinction between “time-obedience”, the “public call of time from the bell tower”, and the 
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industrial working conditions . . . made [employers and workers alike] more keenly aware 
of the economic implications of the organization of time and working time” (Dohrn-van 
Rossum 1996:8). Capitalism is predicated on a distinctly modern and Western notion of 
efficiency in which “each unit of time is utilized in as productive a manner as possible 
given scarce resources” (Hanson 1997:viii), contrasted to the premodern notion of 
efficiency as constant busyness. Thus, “Control of time is a major part of capitalist life” 
(Giddens, quoted in Tucker Jr. 1998:113). 
 Concurrent with the widespread transition to industrial production beginning in 
the eighteenth century, the combination of notions of productivity with the mechanical 
clock’s ability to specify precise start-points, end-points, and duration produced a factory 
life in which the worker’s entire existence outside the home was at the beckon and mercy 
of the clock (Tucker Jr. 1998:113). Attached to a whistle or bell, and often architecturally 
reminiscent of Church and town towers (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:318), the factory clock 
signaled every step of the workday. Its control by management abetted the maximal 
extraction of value creation from the labor force by setting the length of a day’s labor 
during which foremen would spur workers to contribute more than a day’s product 
(Hanson 1997:50). 
 This clock exerted a most direct and unyielding influence on factory life, so it is 
not surprising that it became a primary source of conflict between labor and management. 
                                                                                                                                           
“internalized” character of “time-discipline” based on the individual’s decision to obey a personal 
timepiece (2004:113,  see also Landes 2000:2). 
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Rural persons who came to work in factories often viewed their new jobs as “a kind of jail, 
with the clock as the lock” (Landes 2000:241).100 The primary reason for this sentiment 
was management’s control over the shift clock: “the employer knew the time, whereas 
the employee had to take his word for it” (Landes 2000:241). During the early stages of 
the industrial revolution, labor forces often suspected management of tinkering with the 
shift clock. Their suspicions were exacerbated by the absence of coordination between 
clocks from one location to another (for instance between their town square clock and 
the factory clock), for while clocks were more and more accurate, they still had no global 
referent against which to be set in the first instance, resulting in a proliferation of local 
times.101 The natural response, increasingly within the economic reach of laborers due to 
the proliferation of inexpensive personal timepieces in the nineteenth century, was for 
workers to keep their own clock in order to check the factory’s time against their own.102 
For instance, in 1863, workers at a power-loom spinning mill in Wiltshire, England, 
refused to return from a strike until a workers’ clock was procured to monitor the factory 
horn (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:317). 
 In this manner, factory laborers, like city leaders before them, contested authority 
over time without challenging the authority of a particular type of time—they fought 
“not against time, but about it” (Thompson 1967:85). As the cities imported the Church’s 
                                                 
100 Lateness was one of the most egregious errors an employee could commit, while a personal 
clock was often offered as a prize to productive workers (Landes 2000:241). 
101 For an extended discussion of such variation, see (O'Malley 1990). 
102 This proliferation was, of course, spurred on by increasingly modern manufacturing processes, 
completing a clockwork cycle of sorts in the industrial revolution. 
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time within their walls, workers imported capitalist time into their individual lives. This 
is most evident in the emergence and establishment by the late nineteenth century of the 
concepts of ‘leisure time’ and ‘free time’, ideas responding to a ‘labor time’ controlled by 
someone else. As Stephen Hanson notes, “Early liberal capitalist regimes forced newly 
urbanized workers to adjust to the idea that the rule of abstract time is inexorable; work 
must therefore be steady and disciplined and ‘free time’ kept within strict bounds” 
(1997:viii). Correspondingly, leisure time came to be seen as a measure of wealth, and 
thus deserving of equally zealous safeguarding (Hanson 1997:52).103 Much like urban 
serial engagements, such practices contributed to a further compartmentalization of the 
modern individual life and the embedding of rationalized time consciousness in Western 
Europe. 
 As I will argue in the next section, modern time and territorial sovereignty were 
exported to the colonial frontier during the nineteenth century period of colonial 
nationalism. By then, modern time had become Western Europe’s standard method of 
time reckoning while territorial sovereignty accommodated the majority of Western 
European geography; thus both were part of the effort to re-make colonial cultures in the 
Western European image. Both standards resulted from sociopolitical interactions 
epitomized in churches, cities, and factories. Technologies associated with the rise of 
modern time also facilitated colonial territorial expansion, necessitated a truly globalized 
                                                 
103 The rise of leisure, free, or ‘disposable’ time parallels an emerging distinction between ‘private’ 
and ‘public’ time discussed by Kern (1983:34). 
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time standard, and set the stage for a cataclysm far more destructive than the religious 
wars that provided crucial motive force to the initial rationalization of modern time and 
space. 
 
Time spread: the diffusion of Western time 
 Even though modern sovereignty and time had appeared and in many ways had 
become established in Europe by the nineteenth century, the majority of the world still 
operated based on more locally determined principles. The spread of particularly 
European methods of organizing spatial and temporal social life occurred over the 
following two centuries, and required the ability to first subdue, and then assimilate, 
indigenous territories and cultures. Momentous technological innovations brought the 
world at large within the grasp of European powers, and assimilationist practices 
associated with colonial nationalism effectively remade the frontier in the spatial and 
temporal image of Western Europe. 
 
Ships 
 Accounts of the rise of territorial sovereignty typically view the contribution of 
European mariners either in terms of the importance of navies to military balances of 
power or in terms of the significance of burgeoning long-distance trade (Spruyt 1994:61) 
to the economic mobility of Europe’s emerging middle class. However, maritime 
exploration also made possible a cartographic comprehension of the world and thus 
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underpinned the “geographic imagination” necessary for territorial sovereign delineation 
(Harvey 1990). The epic efforts of seafaring explorers to chart the earth’s surface, and 
later of colonizers to acquire territorial assets for their sovereign homelands (Hall 
1999:77-104) would not have been possible without a consistent, accurate mode of 
navigation. Accurate navigation became a reality with the clock-based discovery of the 
longitude. 
 Sailors had long been able to discern latitude by making use of the North Star and 
the sun (Landes 2000:109). However, longitude was much more problematic: “Since the 
earth turns continually on its axis, there is nothing visible from one longitude that is not 
visible in the course of the day from every other [longitude]” (Landes 2000:110). This 
difficulty results from the earth’s motion, which also brings day and night and makes it 
the “original clock”; ironically, clocks would eventually provide the solution of the 
longitude (Landes 2000:110). Accurate longitude became important in the fifteenth 
century as soon as Europeans undertook transoceanic voyages. By the sixteenth century, 
long-distance trade gave longitude “the highest political and commercial urgency” 
because navigational errors not only risked the lives of those aboard but the substantial 
investments of European entrepreneurs (Landes 2000:111). Accordingly, European 
powers interested in colonial expansion, including Spain, Holland, France, and England, 
initiated contests offering lucrative awards to anyone who could devise an accurate 
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method of determining longitude (Landes 2000:116).104 Better navigation also held 
obvious implications for European navies at the time. Importantly, though, the quest for 
longitude was not viewed as solely a matter of national competition or security. Perhaps 
because it “was the great mystery of the age, a riddle to seamen, a challenge to scientists, a 
stumbling block to kings and statesmen”, and had attained an aura matched only by “the 
fountain of youth and the philosophers’ stone” (Landes 2000:115), longitudinal precision 
was seen as a project “transcending national interests and boundaries” (Landes 2000:168), 
an early example of cooperation in the embryonic international system. 
 The full story of the determination of the longitude deserves more space than is 
presently available.105 In this context, the relevant aspect of its discovery is the crucial 
role that modern time played. The final solution used increasingly accurate 
chronometers106 to monitor time at a place of known longitude, which could then be 
compared with local times at uncharted locales and the difference transformed into a 
measure of distance (Landes 2000:111). Clearly, the further explorers traveled from their 
European points of reference, the more important chronometric consistency and accuracy 
became. Life on the high seas was not conducive to the precision instruments employed 
                                                 
104 Landes catalogs the awards, all of which were sufficient to make the recipient financially secure, 
even wealthy, for life (2000:116). 
105 The paragraph-length treatment here summarizes a centuries-long process of discovery, in 
which successive waves of explorers made use of increasingly accurate devices. For accounts that 
do greater justice to this monumental endeavor, see (Howse 1980, Landes 2000). 
106 Landes discusses different understandings of what constituted a chronometer, although 
generally it denoted only an “instrument for the precise measurement of time” (2000:310). This 
understanding may imply a distinction from other timekeepers in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries based on expense and technical exactitude. In any case, the historical accounts nearly 
always refer to ship timekeepers as chronometers. 
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in land-based clocks, and it was not until the late seventeenth century107 that inventors 
could find a way to make marine chronometers “more or less impervious to motion” 
(Landes 2000:135), allowing for accurate long distance measurement and mapping. Thus, 
the comprehension of the world’s seas was dependent on innovations in time. This causal 
relationship was reversed on land, where railroads and telegraphs both allowed and 
necessitated greater temporal coordination. 
 
Rails and wires 
 Much as maritime knowledge and strength allowed Europeans to seek out and 
subdue peripheral coasts108 around the world, railroads and telegraphs played a crucial 
role in the comprehension and conquest of colonial interiors. Such processes preceded 
colonial wars over territorial delineation of European holdings across Africa and Asia that 
effectively set the boundaries along which future modern states would be constituted 
following the World Wars of the twentieth century. Contrary to maritime pursuits, 
which depended on temporal innovations, railroads and telegraphs revolutionized time 
reckoning conventions as they covered more and more of the globe. 
                                                 
107 As with nearly every other step in the history of Western time, the discovery that allowed 
accurate timekeeping at sea is one whose authorship and date are disputed. In order to respect 
these disputes without engaging them, I have generalized the historical dates, a move further 
justified by the wide historical lens employed in this chapter. For more detailed accounts, turn 
again to (Landes 2000). 
108 I take ‘peripheral’ to spatially denote the many cultures that were “pushed aside, enslaved, and 
in most conceivable fashions exploited” by European “commercial quasi-military enterprises and 
the settlers that followed on their heels” (Hall 1999:100) rather than to imply any ranking of 
civilizations or to indicate the division of the world based on modes of production (Wallerstein 
1974). 
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 Railroads provided the fastest travel and communication over long distances in 
human history. They also crossed a plethora of “local times”, times based on a town or 
city tower clock, itself set against some natural marker such as high noon, and thus 
dependent on the geographic position of the locality (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:323). 
Railways initially set each rail line to the time of the largest city or town it served and 
kept two clocks at all stations, one for the line time and one for local time (O'Malley 
1990:82). This practice lost efficacy as more and more track was laid, placing multiple 
large cities on the same line and running multiple lines through the same city. Along with 
local reckoning, crisscrossing rail lines only exacerbated the confusion caused by the 
multitude of pertinent times involved in train travel (Landes 2000:303), and travelers 
disembarking one train for another at a rail junction often missed their connection. 
 Telegraphs, following fast on the heels of trains globally, and even preceding 
them in some colonies, had been developed to aid in “imperial defense” and “as a stimulus 
to colonial trade” (Kesner 1981:135). They also provided a solution to the problem of 
temporal coordination. By broadcasting a daily time signal, they facilitated the uniform 
correction of local clocks by a single, master clock. Convincing localities to change their 
time to match some distant source was another matter altogether, and required the 
rhetorical, commercial, and political mobilization of arguments running along the lines of 
“an advanced society demand[s] ‘a common standard, to which every individual timepiece 
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shall be made to conform’ ” (O'Malley 1990:105).109 But where railroads covered 
extremely broad distances, such as the US and Russia, a single national time was 
insufficient, and in 1883 time zones were instituted in the US for the first time (O'Malley 
1990:100). 
 In 1884, the International Meridian Conference (IMC) proposed a system of time 
zones covering the entire earth, with the prime meridian marked by the Greenwich 
observatory in England (Landes 2000:304). Unlike the quest for longitude, the IMC and 
subsequent ratification process were sources of persistent international dispute, suggesting 
that time was at least as important to Western national identities as cartography. During 
the conference, Americans claimed that using Greenwich mean time (GMT) challenged 
the “sovereignty” of the American National Observatory (O'Malley 1990:57) and imposed 
“English time” on the US (O'Malley 1990:94). The French delegation refused to accept 
Greenwich unless the US and England adopted the metric system (O'Malley 1990:109). 
France’s proposal was rejected, and the French abstained from the final vote, portending a 
lengthy ratification process. In Europe, Germany did not adopt GMT until 1893, when 
Count Von Moltke argued, “we have in Germany five different units of time . . .  which, 
since we have become an empire, it is proper should be done away with” (O'Malley 
1990:107). Portugal, Holland, Greece, Turkey, Russia, Ireland, and most of South America 
                                                 
109 A more standardized time was further a mark of territorial unity. American entrepreneurs 
marketed an accurate, single time signal as the solution to the problem that “ ‘from the Atlantic to 
the Mississippi, every city and town is keeping a time of its own . . . founded not in natural 
necessity’ and merely a legacy of the past” (O'Malley 1990:77). 
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did not adopt GMT until after 1905. France was most intransigent, refusing to ratify until 
1911, and then only by “defining their standard as ‘Paris Mean Time, retarded by nine 
minutes twenty-one seconds’ ” from GMT (O'Malley 1990:109). These arguments for and 
against GMT indicate both the unifying appeal as well as the subordinating specter of 
globally standardized time. However, the coordinating power that a global standard 
offered to commerce, factories, railways, governments, and militaries eventually 
prevailed.110 Once France gave its mitigated assent, the IMC system, much like the 
telegraphy that facilitated it, covered most of Europe and the Americas. 
 As railroad tracks and telegraph wires enveloped more and more of the earth, 
territory and time came increasingly under the coordination, regulation, and control of 
Western European (and now American) powers.111 Technological dominance on the 
oceans had facilitated European conquests in the eighteenth century, and in the 
nineteenth, it furthered the interior development of Europe and its ‘frontier’. When 
colonialism took on a nationalist character, Western European notions of spatial and 
temporal organization were part of a particular vision of ‘civilization’ that was exported to 
the colonies. 
 
                                                 
110 Standardizations of “national times” accomplished by many of the IMC signatories (Dohrn-van 
Rossum 1996:349) may also have eased the transition to a global standard by providing a positive 
domestic analogy. 
111 Bayly elaborates: “Across the world, the time that [European] watches and clocks displayed was 
also itself converging. Russian imperial expansion into Siberia and eventually to northern China 
required that schemes of local time had to be coordinated. As the nineteenth century progressed, 
more exact and synchronized timekeeping was also required in dependent non-European societies” 
where “local systems of time still prevailed” (2004:17). 
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Frontiers 
 Hall distinguishes between eighteenth century mercantilist imperialism, 
motivated by a desire for increased tradable commodities and taxable wealth available 
through the attainment of colonies (1999:95), and nineteenth century nationalist 
imperialism, “a crusade to transmit [Western European] national culture and institutions 
to the periphery—a process that transformed peripheral societies” (1999:8,215). Railroads 
and especially telegraphs buttressed the kind of order and control necessary for such 
transmissions, aiding the colonial development of commerce, modern administrative 
practices and economic structures, and helping to quell political unrest (Kesner 1981:138, 
Hall 1999:231). As I discuss later, the penetration of the concept of territorial sovereignty 
in the postcolonial era is evidenced by the retention of colonial geographic borders. But 
the Western time that rails and wires helped to standardize and import also remained 
behind when imperialists relinquished the frontier.  
 Nationalist imperialism operated at nearly every level of colonial life, and “Every 
form of social power at the command of the imperialist states was harnessed to 
thoroughly penetrate and transform peripheral society, economy, ideas, and self-
perceptions” (Hall 1999:37). Particularly important in the course of modern sovereignty’s 
expansion was the view of territorial statehood as communicating authority, simplifying 
enforcement, and reifying power (Murphy 1996:90). Furthermore, territorial sovereignty 
was seen as an important part of the positive legal tradition communicated to colonies 
(Murphy 1996:98), as well as the context for modern political administration. 
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 It was through administrative and missionary education that Western European 
nationalists applied a sociocultural pressure to indigenous populations that “left only one 
rational response: abject imitation as a condition of survival and self-affirmation” (Von 
Laue, quoted in Hall 1999:240). Some of the most successful socialization projects took 
place in missionary schools, where the sub-Saharan African schoolboy was “educated in 
the language of his colonial master, according to a curriculum devised by his colonial 
master, within a strict schedule laid out by, and in the time of his colonial master,112 to 
prepare him for service in the military, bureaucratic, ecclesiastical and administrative 
institutions of his colonial master” (Hall 1999:233 emphasis added). Matriculants thus 
came to value the “rubber stamp and the row of pens in the breast pocket” (Ranger, 
quoted in Hall 1999:232) along with the ordering precision of the pocket watch.113 
 C. A. Bayly describes the temporal assimilation of peripheral societies as a 
disciplinary process, noting that “Slave plantations . . . were controlled by bells sounded 
to the time of the master’s watch” (2004:17).114 Western standard time was part of the 
“great domestication” of the periphery, encouraging the “creation of modern societies 
from Indochina to central Africa” (Bayly 2004:51). One of the primary indicators of this 
domestication, or abject imitation, occurred in India and China when “municipal 
                                                 
112 In his discussion of modern schooling, Giddens concludes that “it is surely right to trace the 
origins of school discipline in some part to the regulation of time and space which a generalized 
transition to ‘clock time’ makes possible” (1984:135). 
113 Indeed, Hall views time as one of the most vivid indicators of the full penetration of Western 
values in peripheral societies (1999:237). 
114 While this example may correlate historically with European mercantilist imperialism, evidence 
of the use of personal clocks in eighteenth century plantations supports the contention that 
Western time was ingrained in peripheral society by the nineteenth century. 
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grandees began to build great clock towers to regulate the rhythm of bazaars and offices 
where once they would have put their money into temples or mosques” (Bayly 
2004:17).115  
 Departing their homelands on ships equipped with accurate navigational 
instruments, national imperialists expanded the reach of Western culture around the 
world, transforming nearly every local convention and further delineating the earth’s 
territory.  Whereas eighteenth century imperialism was based on the material interests of 
European metropoles, the nineteenth century variety stemmed from a “will-to-manifest 
identity”—a particularly Western European identity with specific understandings of 
space and time (Hall 1999:91). If the export of sociocultural conventions was in fact an 
effort to “become the composers and fiddlers of the tune to which . . . the rest of the 
world would dance” (Hall 1999:91), Western standard time provided the tempo. The 
embeddedness of modern time and space in peripheral society became evident in the 
postcolonial period following two World Wars. Ironically, railroads and telegraphs, so 
crucial to the diffusion of modern spatial and temporal understandings, contributed 
directly to the first of these cataclysms. 
 
 
                                                 
115 Strang shows how such processes also took root in non-colonized, non-Western societies as a 
form of “defensive Westernization”, perhaps an even more forceful argument for the sociopolitical 
power of Western Europe at the time. “By following European conventions and standards”, 
peripheral countries lowered the likelihood that Western states might interfere in their affairs “on 
the side of an ‘outraged civilization’ ” (1996:37). 
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Time embedded: the destructiveness and durability of Western standard time 
 By the beginning of World War I, Western ways of confronting time and space, 
coupled with superior technologies, had penetrated societies and cultures on every 
continent, permanently transforming local reckonings of space and time. As a measure of 
the effect of European spatio-temporal colonialism, when a long chapter of indigenous 
challenges to external authority culminated in the 1960 United Nations declaration that 
all colonies deserved the right to self-determination, existing map borders (Philpott 
2001:35-36) and clock faces were accepted with little contest. But before this era of 
colonial independence could gain momentum, European metropoles had to exhaust 
themselves in a pair of devastating World Wars, exacerbating the political and material 
costs of maintaining colonies. The First World War displayed the tragic potential of 
Europe’s own territorial and temporal creations, as both nationalized territorial states and 
modern time conventions hastened the onset of hostilities. 
 
Trenches   
 Territorial nationalist accounts of World War I will be familiar to most students 
of international politics. The standard story is woven from threads such as the entangling 
effect of alliances, the Balkan tinder box ignited by the assassination of the Archduke 
Ferdinand, historical and ethnic links binding sentiments across territorial lines, and 
volleyed accusations of overly belligerent heritages. Here, I seek only to call out the 
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importance of modern time to the arrival of the war, as well as the effects and experiences 
of time and space during its prosecution. 
 By the eve of World War I, railroads and telegraphs networked much of the 
European continent together, revolutionizing diplomatic communications and military 
mobility. Whereas previous centuries had imposed significant logistic limitations on troop 
movements (Keegan 1993), the speed and span of railways allowed powerful European 
nation-states to deploy forces to any continental locale in a matter of days, rather than 
weeks. Prima facie an improvement on history, deployment by rail contained a hidden 
danger in that it reduced mobilization timeframes and thus limited opportunities to 
reverse decisions or utilize the appearance of belligerence to thaw diplomatic impasses. 
For instance, once initiated by statesmen, French mobilization plans obeyed only the 
clock and the map:  
 
From the moment mobilization is ordered, every man must know where 
he has to join, and must get there in a given time. Each unit . . . must be 
ready to proceed on a given day at the appointed hour to a prearranged 
destination in a train awaiting it, which in its turn must move according 
to a carefully prepared railway scheme. . . . No change, no alteration is 
possible during mobilization (Taylor, quoted in Kern 1983:269-70).  
 
The most extreme example of thoroughly modern mobilization was the German 
Schlieffen Plan which, to preserve the element of surprise and initiative, drew no 
distinction between mobilization and the immediate invasion of Belgium (Kern 1983:270-
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71). Once German troops were spirited away from their barracks on rail cars, there was 
no mechanism for returning them until the battle had been joined and done. 
 Similarly, although telegraphs and telephones facilitated unprecedented speed of 
communication, contemporaries described telephonic conversations as a “vision of death”, 
apropos of the diplomatic July Crisis that awakened the guns of August in 1914 (Kern 
1983:268). Technologically accelerated exchanges at the highest levels added to “the 
spectacular failure of diplomacy” including “crossed messages . . . sudden surprises, and . . . 
unpredictable timing” (Kern 1983:268). Wrought by the new technologies of the era, 
multiplied temporalities combined with a shared confidence in the “soundness” of the 
basic, territorial organization of Europe (Kern 1983:268) to allow states and their 
increasingly nationalist populations to associate boldness and bravery with quick, decisive 
action (Kern 1983:264). The effect of the new technologies was not a single acceleration, 
but a “series of new and variable paces that supercharged the masses, confused the 
diplomats, and unnerved the generals” (Kern 1983:268). On the eve of World War I, 
time—the traditional “conciliator” of diplomatic crises—effectively disappeared, drawing 
in its wake millions of lives (Kern 1983:274). 
 The temporal experience of the war is exemplified in the daily life of the trenches. 
Stephen Kern generalizes this as a “thickened” perception of the present, when past and 
future slipped away and the paradoxical duo of boredom and danger bound the 
imagination to an endless progression of days in the trenches (1983:279,290,293). World 
War I also saw the proliferation of the military wrist watch, a timepiece hitherto 
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considered “unmanly” (Kern 1983:288). As important as clocks had been for delivering 
the common soldier to his deployment locale on time, wrist watches were even more 
crucial in the trenches, when the importance of a coordinated instant of attack 
necessitated a pre-offensive ritual in which “a runner distributed watches which had been 
synchronized at field headquarters” (Kern 1983:288). The relationship between the wrist 
watch and thickened, now-time is best characterized by Edmund Blunden, who observed 
that “Time went by, but no one felt the passage of it, for the shadow of death lay over the 
dial” (quoted in Kern 1983:293). 
 Wrist watches more often marked the occasion of mass casualties rather than any 
moment of success. But Western standard time and all its associated technologies outlived 
the war, as did a belief in territorial nation-states. At the end of the war, the Treaty of 
Versailles, in addition to setting the terms of peace, took another substantial step in the 
comprehensive partitioning of the earth’s surface by setting borders in Eastern Europe 
and much of the Middle East.116 European colonies would be the sites of significant 
fighting in the next World War, further reifying the sense of claimable territory and 
preceding claims by those territories’ indigenous populations. At the end of World War I, 
the writer James Joyce provided a synopsis of the new, deadly nexus of modern 
territoriality and temporality that would dominate the next half-century: “I hear the ruin 
                                                 
116 For an account of the Paris Peace Conference that pays particular attention to the tragic parlor 
games of territorial negotiations, see (Macmillan 2003). 
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of all space, shattered glass and toppling masonry, and time one livid final flame” (quoted 
in Kern 1983:293). 
 
Nascent states 
 After Europe and the rest of the world narrowly survived a second apocalypse, 
holding colonies became an increasingly difficult and indefensible practice (Philpott 
2001:153-250). Philpott argues that the abrogation of colonial claims throughout Europe’s 
periphery embedded the idea of territorial sovereignty, “extend[ing] globally the formula 
of 1648” (2001:155). For instance, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514, 
adopted toward the end of 1960, granted the right of self-determination to colonial 
peoples without establishing an explicit criterion for international recognition of the new 
polities. Without a criterion, and with independence within reach, former colonies 
largely accepted colonial borders as the limits of their new states (Philpott 2001:155,36). 
The reification of Western organizational concepts was further encouraged during this 
period by the return of European- and American-educated indigenous elites, who 
brought with them Western ideas and ideals such as national pride, the value of freedom, 
and capitalism (Philpott 2001:93-94).117 Similarly, many indigenous soldiers were sent to 
the fronts of World War II, where to some extent they became indoctrinated with the 
Western ideals for which they were presumably fighting (Philpott 2001:194). Philpott 
                                                 
117 Consequently, Western-educated elites shared few concerns with indigenous social struggles 
related to economic justice or concerns other than national independence (Philpott 2001:198). 
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concludes that the particular character of successful postcolonial independence 
movements, based on Western concepts, thus encouraged the subsequent era of economic 
neocolonialism (Philpott 2001:198). 
 I argue that, along with Western territorial and economic ideals, former colonies 
adopted without significant opposition the temporal conventions contained in Western 
standard time. As discussed earlier, modern European temporality featured significantly 
in colonial education and governance training during the nineteenth century, hence 
Western temporal conventions were already in place by the 1960s. And since ideas have 
the ability to shape identities (Philpott 2001:8, Hall 1999:215-16), we cannot omit the 
significance of a specific type of temporal reckoning, in this case that propagated by 
Western European colonial powers, in shaping the daily lives and roles of indigenous 
peoples around the world. As many colonies gained their formal independence in the 
1960s, they evoked the earlier struggles for autonomy in cities and factories by 
challenging the sources of political control without questioning the modes of organization 
of that control. If the reasoning in this chapter has been persuasive, then the conclusion 
that authority over time is a component of postcolonial struggle while the authority of 
Western standard time remains a colonial artifact should also hold. 
 The authority of Western standard time was not a given outside the European 
continent—political and social power embedded it around the world. In the periphery, 
authority over time has lately been “culturally neutralized” as “ ‘modernization’ or simply 
‘development’ ”, part of a general attempt to create “ ‘westernized’ societies in aboriginal 
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dress as a salve to ‘national’ pride” (Hall 1999:240).118 It follows from this that ‘aboriginal’ 
garments today, in addition to holding a row of pens, continue to make room for a 
Western standardized timepiece. 
 
Conclusion: modernity’s most global hegemon 
 Standard accounts of the twentieth century describe two eras of globalization. 
The first ended almost as soon as the century began, subverted and subsumed in three 
decades of world wars (Ferguson 2006). The second era followed colonial independence, 
and continues today. But taking a trans-economic view of modern history allows a 
different image to clarify. While trade and commerce have expanded in fits and starts, 
dominant conceptions of political space and social time have matured, expanded, and 
solidified their hold on the international system. Today, territory subject to multiple 
authority claims is the exception rather than the rule. And while transnational or 
multinational governance and political power represent an emerging challenge to the 
territorial sovereign state, the outcome of this struggle is far from decided. 
 The case for the global dominance of Western standard time is even stronger. At 
the time of this study, there is only one prominent system of global time zones—that 
instituted by the 1884 IMC. Furthermore, outside of scientific laboratories and other 
highly specialized sites, daily modern life almost anywhere runs according to readily 
                                                 
118 For postcolonial analyses of development and modernization in terms of temporality, see 
(Inayatullah and Blaney 2004, Blaney and Inayatullah 2006). 
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available, standardized timepieces counting off uniform seconds, minutes, and hours of 
the day. Challenges to modern, rationalized, abstract clock time have yet to be found. 
There exist no multinational corporate efforts to offer a different method of reckoning the 
progress from day to night to day again, no rogue actors calling for a 23-hour day, and 
common clichés that describe fundamentalist regimes as trying to ‘turn back the clock’ 
only signify the hegemony of the metaphorical referent.  
 In this chapter, I offered a history of the present method of time reckoning, 
Western standard time, arguing that it was an Enlightenment sibling of one of the 
essential constitutive features of IR—territorial state sovereignty. In addition to 
advocating a greater place for temporality in studies of international politics, this history 
had the genealogical intent of uncovering—or rediscovering—the contingent, abstract, 
and particular roots of a mode of reckoning that is today largely understood as given, 
natural, and universal. I freely admit to doing violence to the sophisticated accounts of 
sovereignty and time used in this sketch, and appeal to the relationship between the 
necessary historical span and the available space as rendering such decisions unavoidable. 
Furthermore, since the most basic objective of this chapter was to increase scholarly 
attention to time in IR, its inherent sketchiness might also serve as a catalog of empirical 
research opportunities. It is only in such efforts and opportunities that IR can begin to 






(Re)Inventing the wheel 
 
 
Truth is only a mobile army of metaphors. 




 Having argued in the first chapter that a significant gap exists between the use 
and study of time in IR, I offered in the second chapter an empirical illustration by 
charting the coeval emergence and reification of modern sovereignty and modern 
temporality from the European Enlightenment through colonial independence. In this 
chapter, I contend that while sovereignty has lately received significant scrutiny in IR, its 
modern sibling remains a theoretical doppelganger. Spatial components construct most of 
IR, a trend persistent in recent developments committed to accommodating new 
international political realities. Even as they challenge the canon on some grounds, 
scholars fail to examine the modern temporal underpinnings of the discipline and so 
buttress the edifice they seek to remake. 
 To demonstrate this persistent hegemony, I analyze movements that question the 
centrality of the state and that unearth the social significance of new technologies, 
finding that their proponents continue to treat time as either cyclical or linear. This 
Enlightenment iniquity further reifies modernity’s temporal dominance in IR. I then 
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return to Baert’s social theory to understand this disciplinary dynamic, proposing that IR 
evinces a maintenance-based second order self-reflection in which temporally open 
theories are vulgarized in order to square them with the dominant metaphorical 
framework. As an antidote, I propose a new metaphor for thinking about time that 
accommodates both the cyclicality and the linearity of social reality. 
 
Conventional challengers 
 The end of the Cold War exposed space, but not time, to diversity in IR 
theory. With the demise of the bi-polar world of superpowers that had fascinated 
(especially neorealist) theorists for several decades, questions about trans-state actors 
and sub-state political processes gained relevance as scholars looked for additional 
components and phenomena to understand the rapidly transforming international 
realm. I identify and analyze two movements, postinternationalism and 
accelerationism, that attempt to reconcile theory with contemporary international 
reality by looking beyond and within the state. Both movements mount challenges to 
the IR canon in terms of their substantive focus. However, both acquiesce to the 
canonical view of time by relying on cyclical (postinternationalism) or linear 
(accelerationism) metaphors, thus excluding temporality from their updates to IR 
theory.119 I contend that this blithe use of a particular, static understanding of time in 
                                                 
119 This chapter therefore presents a ‘hard case’ of sorts by showing the persistence of status quo 
temporality in theoretical movements that otherwise swim outside the IR mainstream. 
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forward-looking theory demonstrates the organizing power of modern temporality. 
Much as the last chapter found that challenges to authority over modern time 
unwittingly strengthened the power of modern time in sites of contestation, this 
section exposes presumably avant-garde IR as temporally traditional and thus 
reproductive of the status quo. 
 
Postinternationalism 
 Exemplified by James Rosenau, postinternationalism seeks to understand the 
“extensive and rapid alteration” in world politics precipitated by processes that base 
authority and legitimacy more and more on performance—a trend with which the 
nation-state is ill-equipped to keep pace (1992:4). As its ability to comprehensively 
perform all of the tasks that populaces expect diminishes, so does the state’s legitimacy, 
impelling citizens to look for solutions in both more global and more local settings 
(Rosenau 1992:7-8). The overall result is the emergence of disaggregated or “bifurcated” 
subsystems of spheres of authority—clusters of legitimate power reaching both beyond 
and beneath the nation-state (Rosenau 1992:10). Bifurcation of authority, along with the 
ongoing globalization of capitalist economies, results in a “new world order” of 
“permanent commotion” (Rosenau 1992:13) in which processes of local fragmentation—
sometimes portrayed as the resurgence of ethnic communities—and global integration 
combine in a single phenomenon known as “fragmegration” (Rosenau 1997:364).  
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 Postinternationalism holds an inclusive ontological understanding of the 
international system that treats the aforementioned spheres of authority, along with 
individual citizens, industrial production networks, and transnational organizations as the 
analytic equals of nation-states (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004:13).120 It can therefore 
accommodate a variety of new topics and approaches to the study of world politics, 
painting a considerably more complex and textured picture than traditional accounts 
which elevate the state above all other considerations.121 For example, an insistence on 
the importance of individuals and processes has great potential for inquiries into political 
identity, nationalism and ethnic strife, NGOs and the UN, and economic interdependence 
and globalization. But in spite of its focus on revolutions in international affairs and its 
interest in ontological egalitarianism, postinternationalism ignores the continuity of 
Western standard time in world politics and thus privileges a spatial image that biases 
investigations and restricts theoretical conclusions.  
 Like so much of IR, postinternationalism favors spatial imagery, as in its reading 
of the sudden end of the Cold War as caused in large part by economically networked 
individuals overflowing traditional nation-state political jurisdictions (Rosenau 1992:13). 
Likewise, postinternationalists understand globalization not as simply capitalism 
universalized, but as a process occurring at numerous sites of fragmegration, which are 
                                                 
120 Rosenau proposes to manage this proliferation of variables by borrowing the idea of an adaptive 
system from complexity theory (2007:94-5). 
121 By this criterion, traditional accounts include, but are not limited to, classical realism, 
neorealism, neoliberalism, conservative constructivism à la Wendt, and LDPT. 
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also the loci for overlapping spheres of authority (Rosenau 1997:361). Yale Ferguson’s and 
Richard Mansbach’s “nested polities” approach further develops this image by pointing 
out how “some polities are encapsulated by others and embedded within them” (2004:24). 
Networks, spheres, nests, encapsulating, and embedding—all descriptive terms in the 
service of ‘new’ theory that evoke a distinctly spatial image of world politics. In fact, the 
postinternationalist lexicon appears to have been adapted from world systems theorists’ 
account of concentrically nested spheres of production.  
 This imbalance in favor of spatiality penetrates beyond basic descriptive 
terminology. Postinternationalism misses altogether the importance of Western standard 
time in the globalizing processes that helped make politics international. Ferguson and 
Mansbach acknowledge that territorial sovereignty was exported through colonialism and 
the application of bureaucratic skill (2004:81), but exclude from their discussion any 
treatment of how notions of efficiency and a unified method of time reckoning facilitated 
technological domination and civilizing missions. As well, Rosenau’s examination of 
globalization makes room for a variety of ideational, normative, and practical 
considerations (1997:362) but excludes modern temporality—one of the most globalized 
of all ideas, norms, or practices. Commenting that “few cascading sequences actually 
encircle and encompass the entire globe” (Rosenau 1997:361) implicitly calls attention to 
those that do, but postinternationalism remains preoccupied with global capitalism and 
information technological innovation, thus prohibiting any contributions originating 
from the study of globalized modern time. Finally, without time postinternationalism 
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self-confirms via selection on the dependent variables of turbulence and change. The 
continuity of Western standard time poses an important counter to images of pure 
upheaval in the international system, but this warning goes mostly unheeded in 
postinternationalist theory’s spatial offering. 
 Recent postinternationalist work makes a nominal effort to incorporate time 
(Ferguson and Mansbach 2004:67-105), but understands it only as a developmental proxy 
locating a given polity’s nested position in political space.122 This does not move beyond 
purely spatial geopolitics (such as that found in neorealism) as much as it proliferates a 
distributional account across levels of analysis.123 Time in this sense is important only as a 
determinant of relative positions within and between clusters of political authority. Such 
a demure offering seems at odds with the significant changes to traditional theory that 
postinternationalists herald, but becomes predictable when viewed through a 
temporalized lens. Postinternationalists cling to an ahistorical world view epitomized by 
Ferguson’s and Mansbach’s insistence that if time (as development) be at all studied in 
relation to space, one must be held constant while analyzing the other (2004:71). This 
resolve allows only a “ceaseless and universal” (eternal and permutational) vision of a 
future constituted solely by cycles of fragmegration in which the emergence of large 
                                                 
122 This view of time is typical of Western modernity and has been implicated in cultural Othering 
practices related to colonialism (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004:55-58). 
123 Similar to their omission of time from globalizations, Ferguson and Mansbach address identity 
and loyalty under the rubric of political space (2004:67), subordinating the processes by which 
those elements are formed—processes that may rely on a sense of history and time distanciation—
under an interest in their distributional position. 
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polities produces problems of control that can only be solved by “fission” within 
traditional social units (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004:104,4). Such fission reduces 
capacity, necessitating a renewed pursuit of larger polities that lead to new problems of 
control, and the process iterates ad infinitum (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004:99,103). Thus 
postinternationalism’s ahistoricism transforms a preoccupation with change into a source 
of continuity, not in the sense of temporal hegemony (which it elides) but in the 
restriction of future possibility—the only disruptions accommodated are extant ones. 
 The postinternationalist ceaseless fragmegrative dialectic constrains contingency 
in a manner reminiscent of world systems theory’s reification of the world capitalist 
system. Both theories make substantial contributions to the understanding of how the 
world, as it is today, came to be. However, temporal ignorance and spatial biases trap both 
in an analytical cul-de-sac. World systems theory offers a perpetual struggle in which 
states move between the core, semi-periphery, and periphery. Postinternationalism offers 
persistent commotion whose periods are distinguishable from each other only by the size 
and arrangement of their various spheres of authority and sub-systems. Neither 
movement can imagine a means by which the international system might someday come 
to be other than as it is now.124 Like world systems theory, postinternationalism is “Whig 
                                                 
124 Among postinternationalists, Rosenau comes closest, predicting an eventual “uneven 
fragmegration” when globalization increasingly sets the terms of localization (1997:364). But 
uneven fragmegration is not much more flexible a vision of the future than tightening and relaxing 
capitalist cycles—both understand potential changes as permutations of the eternal form. 
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history”125 in that it most effectively describes an endpoint126 rather than a moment on an 
unfixed temporal continuum (Schmidt 1998:18). Both theories are ostensibly concerned 
with challenging the priority of the sovereign nation-state—world systems theorists do so 
by subjugating the state to economic forces, postinternationalists by immersing it in a 
plurality of factors. However, by finalizing the outcome of their respective challenges, 
both abort the ongoing process of reflection by which wisdom can be gleaned from 
novelty,127 elevating the present and marginalizing ‘future shocks’. 
 
Accelerationism 
 A second challenge to statist IR concerned with new international political 
developments but employing an approach and viewpoint distinct from 
postinternationalism is actually an amalgam of postmodernist’s128 efforts. Research threads 
within the movement are fairly diverse but a common temporality binds them together, 
and is most aptly summarized as the belief that time, ever hastening, is overwhelming 
                                                 
125 Schmidt defines Whig history as the tendency to see historical events as progressing up to this 
particular point in time. This may be seen as the forward-reading version of presentism. Linking 
analytically similar elements to each other historically writes the present backwards (Schmidt 
1998:18). 
126 In both cases discussed here, the endpoint is described by a cycle. 
127 As such, both theories may also be examples of “contextualist” theoretical views, in which real-
world events overdetermine academic developments (Schmidt 1998:33). 
128 In this discussion, I ignore theorists’ self-conscious affiliations and deem them all 
postmodernists because their shared concern with the relationship between speed, acceleration, 
and politics focuses on a problematization of modern social life. Der Derian, for instance, refers to 
himself as a poststructuralist but examines “postmodern practices” of technology that defy “the 
grand theories or definitive structures which impose rationalist identities or binary oppositions to 
explain international relations” (1990:297). 
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space.129 Thus, I use the umbrella term ‘accelerationism’ to begird the scholars discussed 
in this section. Accelerationism begins with the observation that traditional, territorial 
understandings of the world are outmoded: “There is a movement from geo- to chrono-
politics: the distribution of territory becomes the distribution of time” (Virilio, quoted in 
der Derian 1990:307). In place of territory, an era of increasing social velocity, introduced 
by material innovations, holds sway. Paul Virilio refers to this as a “dromocratic 
revolution”—the age of the accelerator—in modern politics concerned with the impact of 
technology and automation on, among other things, war-making capabilities (quoted in 
der Derian 1990:307). Dromocratic conflict “inaugurates the war of time”, focusing less on 
destructive power and more on payload delivery speed and simulated capabilities (Virilio 
1998 [1986]:49). 
 James der Derian applies Virilio’s thinking to the growing “military-
entertainment nexus” made possible by increased representational capabilities, which 
make conflicts “more ‘real’ in time than in space”  (1990:297) by making “image . . . more 
credible than fact” (1992:134). Sinister byproducts of this nexus include the “valorization 
of velocity”, which transforms change itself into an object (1992:136); a decline in 
empathy;130 and the rise of “cyberdeterrence”, a triptych of media voyeurism, 
                                                 
129 Der Derian most glibly characterizes this as “pace” over “space” (1992:3), a view stylized slightly 
differently in (Virilio 1998 [1986]:46, and Walker 1993:5). 
130 Der Derian explains that the closer technology comes to simulating the “Other”, the less we will 
be able to see ourselves in “others” (1990:298, and 1992:4). 
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technological exhibitionism, and strategic simulation (2001:18). These effects combined 
replace the trauma of warfare with “drama without tragedy” (der Derian 2001:11).131 
 Accelerated social velocities unerringly expose and exacerbate persistent 
paradoxes of modernity. Virilio, for example, claims that speed is negatively related to 
political freedom,132 and that “the violence of speed has become both the location and the 
law, the world’s destiny and its destination” (1998 [1986]:57). Virilio’s future is a world in 
which “time becomes flattened out, there is no room either for the working of deeper 
level causes and forces or for the kind of self-conscious planning with which counter-
hegemonic action is associated” (Hutchings 2007:80).133 Likewise, der Derian’s growing 
and inextricable link between weapons systems and entertainment technologies produces 
futures concerned only with simulating without really ‘knowing’ in the sole service of 
killing without seeing (2001:89). These phenomena overwhelm reflective and ethical 
subjectivity in an apocalyptic vision distinct from LDPT or teleological constructivism in 
tone but not in temporality. Accelerationist time is unique in its pessimistic predictions 
about the technologized deconstruction of modern social life which occupy the opposite 
pole from linear-progressive outcomes. While I have hitherto equated Baert’s closed 
                                                 
131 Der Derian seems to be speaking exclusively to the new war-making experience of high-
technology armies such as the United States, rather than their more conventionally defended 
targets. It is safe to assume that the objects of dromocratic warfare still experience both tragedy 
and drama. 
132 Speed is a “region of time” that “shrinks” political space, the “field of freedom of political action” 
(Virilio 1998 [1986]:51). 
133 Virilio, among others, concludes that progress is being replaced by “the concept of ‘accident’ ” 
(Hutchings 2007:80), a claim with stark implications for liberal democratic military interventions 
as well as Just War principles such as double effect (Owens 2003, for a summary of the Just War 
tradition, including double effect, see Bellamy 2006). 
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historical conception with linear-progressivism, accelerationism suggests a linear-
regressivism. However, in terms of temporality, the former part of the hyphenated term 
takes precedence over the latter—Virilio’s and der Derian’s retention of closed, linear 
images of the future mimics rather than challenges linear-progressivists.134 
 Virilio and der Derian provide material technological complements to R. B. J. 
Walker’s most extensive critique of spatial understandings in IR, which also poses the best 
example of modern temporality’s hold on accelerationist thinking.  Walker eviscerates the 
canon’s constraint of “all intimations of a chronopolitics within the ontological 
determinations of a geopolitics” that delimits “temporal possibilities” along nation-state 
boundaries  (1993:6). However, his critique is based on an inside/outside binary that 
conceives two mutually exclusive temporal possibilities, and so reproduces through a 
basic theoretical choice not only the linearity of other accelerationists, but also its general 
metaphorical context. The first possibility, linear progress, Walker attributes to political 
theory’s interpretation of history as the “long march to modernity”, which occurs within 
the sovereign state’s political community (1993:30). The second possibility is cyclical 
violence, associated with IR’s prioritization of state power over ethics (Walker 1993:30) 
and a territorial delineation of sovereignty that precludes any politics and thus any 
                                                 
134 Virilio and der Derian are further vulnerable to temporal critique because they leave the 
character of Western standard time un-scrutinized. The very speed with which they are fascinated 
drives performance via standardized temporal conventions (nanoseconds and smaller). Similarly, 
der Derian’s exposition of the prison as panopticon (1990:304) misses the fundamental importance 
of time to its performance. In the prison, surveillance works in tandem with an ability to regulate 
activities through time obedience (Adam 2004:113): activities and locales are only open to 
prisoners at specific times and for specified durations. 
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progress between states (Walker 1993:63).135 While innovatively applied to the sovereign 
state, Walker’s binary maintains the Enlightenment segregation of time that delimits 
theory by requiring a selection between (amoral) cyclicality and (progressive) linearity. 
Within this framework the contradiction between inside and outside, not technology, 
produces a sense of temporal acceleration (1993:5), which can only exacerbate 
international cycles of violence by increasing their frequency. This is not so much the 
regressive endpoint of Virilio and der Derian as it is a self-reinforcing theoretical tension. 
 Walker’s theory is more coherent than other accelerationists, and his treatment of 
linear temporality progressive rather than regressive. I include him under the umbrella 
movement due to his purely negative assessment of the relationship between 
international cycles of violence136 and domestic linear progress. Furthermore, the modern 
dichotomy that Walker exegetically extracts from modern sovereignty and maps onto 
political theory and IR is limited in two ways. First, it assigns to IR a singular, cyclical 
temporality rather than the dichotomized choice that actually characterizes the discipline. 
Second, Walker treats domestic politics as subordinate to international relations, 
assuming that external conditions preclude the diffusion of progress across state borders. 
                                                 
135 Walker discusses temporal Othering as a feature of territorial sovereignty, which depicts the 
“outside” as a “realm in which to be brave against adversity or patient enough to tame those whose 
life is not only elsewhere but also back then” (1993:174). 
136 Another implication of Walker’s failure to challenge linear-progressive and cyclical-violent 
assumptions is that he misses the potential of recursive social processes to produce increasing 
ethical or normative momentum. This is the optimistic thesis of mainstream constructivism, see 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). 
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Engaging with the political theory of William Connolly counters this bias within a 
broader argument against accelerationism’s cynical view of technology.  
 In spite of his common concern with speed, Connolly finds ample alternatives to 
accelerationist doomsdays. For instance, der Derian sees in the “valorization of velocity” 
echoes of fascism’s emergence during the European interwar period (1990:306). But 
Connolly views fascism as the “failure” of the first trial of modernity and detects the 
sources of a successful second attempt in the opportunities for democratic coordination 
and greater autonomy of identity construction made possible by technological innovation 
(2002:160-2).137 He further opposes accelerative technologies to nationalistic, ethnic, and 
fundamentalist movements, all attempts to “decelerate” late modern social time via a 
return to an “imagined past” (2002:143).138 Finally, he refutes accelerationist assumptions 
regarding the negative relationship between speed and sociopolitical subjectivity by 
pointing out that “deliberative” democratic practices often serve to iron out differences, 
producing a homogenized, “circumscribed politics of place” (2002:142-4). For Connolly, 
accelerative phenomena challenge rather than amplify modern dilemmas by promoting a 
“time of becoming” that emphasizes the creative potential of contingency and thus 
                                                 
137 This contention pits Connolly not only against IR accelerationists, but also other political 
theorists such as Sheldon Wolin, who bemoans the loss of the “leisurely pace” necessary for 
democratic deliberation (1997). More generally, Baert suggests that self-reflection requires 
time, and is thus threatened by temporal accelerations (1992b:145). 
138 In fairness, this analysis of fundamentalist movements as desiring deceleration may be 
understood as a negative potential outcome of humanity’s confrontation with acceleration. 
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opposes modernity’s reified “time of being”139 (Hutchings 2007:156). Furthermore, new 
technologies open up greater possibilities for “experiments of the self” and “fugitive 
democracy”, a “plurality of interconnected sites of democratic action . . . shaping . . . 
working conditions, educational possibilities, forms of identity, income levels, ecological 
environment, border relations and citizen entitlements” (Connolly 2002:153). Crucially, 
fugitive democracy crosses and even marginalizes territorial sovereign boundaries with 
regularity.  
 Connolly’s contemplation of social acceleration is based on a fundamentally 
indeterminate view of temporality that treats irreversible “rifts” in time as constitutive of 
political experience rather than as a threat to political stability (2002:144-6). Rifts open up 
alternative times and “life-paces” which are crucial to variation in political identities 
(Connolly 2002:142). This understanding is reminiscent of the ontological function 
attached to time, via novelty, in Baert. It also furthers Connolly’s proposition that 
technological speed can be helpful rather than harmful in that faster technologies foster 
greater experimentation and thus proliferate variation and plurality. Connolly thus 
simultaneously opposes both strands of accelerationism. He challenges Virilio’s and der 
Derian’s linear-regressivism by treating the affects of technological innovation as speed, a 
scalar rate of activity, rather than as velocity, which attaches a direction to that rate.140 He 
                                                 
139 A time of being exists “when relatively stable contexts for political judgment and action inform 
meanings of “progress in accordance with given, sedimented criteria” (Hutchings 2007:156). 
140 As such, Connolly cannot be considered an optimistic accelerationist because his treatment of 
the affects of faster technology is based in the constitution of politics rather than on specific 
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also argues that developmental progress need not acquiesce to international power politics, 
as Walker concludes. In these ways, Connolly’s assessment of technological innovation 
provides a useful balance to the downward spiraling specter of conflict and violence 
imagined by accelerationists, and suggests that postmodernism need not necessarily move 
beyond hope. 
 
Academic culpability: schizophrenia in theory 
 Postinternationalists and accelerationists grapple with new international political 
realities but reach for the leading edge of history with an ill-equipped grasp of time, 
further reifying the modern temporality fundamental to the world they claim is outdated. 
The cyclical presentism of postinternationalism and the linear-regressive visions of 
accelerationism demonstrate that even ill-equipped conventions retain their embedded 
power for as long as they remain in the uncritical employ of scholars. The irony of this 
phenomenon is instantiated in Walker, whose spatiotemporal critique of IR theory 
unwittingly reproduces some contents of the sovereign container he seeks to unpack. 
Why does this happen? Are postinternationalists and accelerationists disingenuous 
renovators of the theoretical edifice? Or are they examples of an ongoing paradigmatic 
failure on the part of IR to understand time? Drawing propositions about academic 
culpability from Baert’s discussions of presentism, novelty and maintenance-based second 
                                                                                                                                           
political outcomes. In this sense, the term ‘accelerationism’ captures the inherent linearity in 
Virilio’s and der Derian’s analysis of changes in social velocity understood as speed and direction. 
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order self-reflection, I argue for the latter possibility—IR has not yet adequately engaged 
with time as a concept, an oversight evidenced by the conventional temporality running 
through the field from core to frontier. Additionally, that temporality reinforces itself, 
serving a disciplinary function within the field that constrains efforts to imagine 
alternative temporalities. 
 Baert argues that knowledge construction in the scientific community is itself a 
temporalized phenomenon (1992b:89). Real time is asymmetrical, in that “the real past 
has occurred in a particular way and . . . nothing in the present or future can change that” 
(1992b:76). However, understandings of time are always negotiable in that “its meaning 
or representation . . . can change and . . .  does so regularly” (Baert 1992b:76). Such 
epistemic alterations are only accomplished in the present, granting it a “special 
philosophical status” that enables scholars to “escape the [understandings] of the past” and 
treat “the past and future [as] temporal horizons of the present” (Baert 1992b:76). Brian 
Schmidt has conducted an incisive examination of IR based on this idea, criticizing as 
“presentist” research that attempts to construct a historical lineage based on an analytical 
framework in which scholars “stipulate certain ideas, themes, genres, or texts as 
functionally141 similar” (1998:25). To the extent that the past and future are always less 
                                                 
141 Baert claims that functionalism is the result of failed sociological attempts to discover the 
“engines of history” (1992b:138). These failures caused a reactionary withdrawal from 
historicism and a “retreat to the present” using as its “central metaphor for understanding 
society . . .  the human organism, with the different parts functionally interrelated and 
directed towards the equilibrium, survival or reproduction of the larger whole” (Baert 
1992b:138-9). 
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complete realities compared to the present, Baert views such biasing as inevitable to 
interpretation. By making presentism endemic to knowledge, Baert cautions scholars who 
wish to understand the historical underpinnings of current affairs and reinforces Schmidt, 
who argues that it encourages “a retrospectively created construct determined by present 
criteria and concerns” that prioritizes current functionality over discursive evidence from 
the real past (Schmidt 1998:25).  
 Baert’s claim about the present is not that it is more important than past or future, 
but simply that it is defined and differentiated by encounters with novelty (1992b:80).142 
Marginalizing novelty thus constrains understanding in the present and hinders attempts 
to reconvene the historical context from which “received” understandings—such as 
Western standard time—emerged victorious (Baert 1992b:80).143 Along this line of 
reasoning, the omission in IR of explicit discussions about time goes beyond reifying 
Enlightenment temporality. It also reduces the ability of scholars to accommodate novelty, 
which in turn restricts open images of the past, present, and future.144 
                                                 
142 It is only after the present has emerged in a novel way that agents can seek to understand it, 
as well as reconstruct the past in light of present novelties (Baert 1992b:81). 
143 In his account of the English School, Dunne provides a discursive historical reconstruction of 
the origins of a movement that counters the mythologized academic encounters and ideological 
revolutions that pass down a “received . . . identity of the discipline” (1998:1). 
144 This claim holds special significance for rationalists who evaluate theory empirically, partly 
based on its ability to ‘predict’ future events. For example, see (Keohane 1988). For a critique of the 
failure of nearly all IR theories to predict the novel end of the Cold War, see (Gaddis 1992). 
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 Presentism is pervasive in scholarship because novelty is viewed as a 
condemnation of theory—a mark of its inaccuracy (Baert 1992b:91).145 Novelty is itself 
social in that it must contradict some prior “ ‘cognitive frame of reference which gives 
meaning and intelligibility’ ” (Baert 1992b:91). One response to novelty reconstructs the 
past so as to remove the oppositional relationship between the reference frame and the 
novel event.146 My criticism of IR is not that this reconstruction occurs, but that its 
occurrence is then denied via a naturalization of the aspects of the past that confirm the 
current account—what is, was inevitable. The neglect of Western standard time and 
modern temporality epitomizes this naturalization, making IR scholars culpable in the 
continued dominance of a particular, and once conditional, understanding of temporality 
and time reckoning.147 Challenging this trend by treating time and temporality as 
contingent, contestable, and inherently social reconciles theorizing with novelty, and 
allows for the recovery of missing dimensions of the past, present, and future (Baert 
1992b:132).148 
                                                 
145 In this sense, the persistence of novelty indicates paradigmatic theoretical failure rather than 
reality itself. 
146 This may entail a paradigm shift in which ‘marginal’ events are “re-categorized” as having 
greater importance (Baert 1992b:132). 
147 For instance, scholars may have a vested interest in maintaining cyclical understandings of time. 
There is an etymological link between the Hebrew “sh-b-th”, meaning to “cease laboring”; the 
Jewish Sabbath, occurring every seven days; and the academic sabbatical tradition based on seven-
year cycles (Zerubavel 1985:7). It has also been suggested that scholars preserve “a cyclical 
semester system and a traditional conception of leisure [time] institutionalized as tenure” (Hanson 
1997:18). 
148 This contention is itself a result of Baert’s sense of diachronic irony, which suggests that work 
within existing paradigms often has the unintended consequence of undermining that paradigm by 
exposing lacuna and novel events that the paradigm is ill-equipped to understand (1992b:131). As 
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 A second response to novelty subordinates it to the past by denying its essence as 
contradictory of the received frame of reference. Treating theories as metatheoretical 
‘events’ or moments uncovers this disciplinary dynamic in IR.149 Temporally open 
movements such as constructivism and classical realism may be considered novelties in IR 
because they refuse the Enlightenment dichotomy that instructs theorists to choose either 
ahistorical or closed historical models. Viewed in the standard, dichotomized frame of 
reference, these movements appear schizophrenic, “a state characterized by the 
coexistence of contradictory or incompatible elements” (2007).150 Intradisciplinary 
responses to such perceived incompatibilities engage in the mechanics of denial151 by 
vulgarizing these movements in order to make them more amenable to the dominant 
frame of reference (see figure two, page 118). As discussed in chapter one, responses to 
                                                                                                                                           
an example of imagining a social dimension of time, Bourdieu argues that substituting strategy for 
rule-following “reintroduce[s] time, with its rhythm, its orientation, its irreversibility” (quoted in 
Tucker Jr. 1998:69). This notion suggests that strategy may serve a decelerating purpose meant to 
make social exchanges less automatic in the pursuit of an unconventional outcome. In his 
incorporation of Bourdieu in security studies, Williams refers to fully inculcated rules and 
strategies as “nearly timeless” (2007:37). 
149 Yet a third response already covered is that of world systems theorists and postinternationalists: 
the announcement of a new epoch to which elided historical phenomena have been contributing, 
and from which there is no escape (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004:24). This response over-
privileges rather than denies novelty in the present. Its social aspect concerns the possibility that 
the events enlisted in its defense may have always been present but theoretically ignored until 
they exerted an undeniable influence on world politics. Genealogical histories prefer the pluralistic 
benefits of light shed on marginalized aspects of social life to the revolutionary heat of a supposed 
‘new world order’ based on newly ‘discovered’ causal factors. 
150 This encounter between novel theories and standard frameworks can also be related to 
Foucault’s critique of the examination as a “normalizing gaze” that constitutes a “whole field of 
knowledge” rather than evaluating it (1977:184-86). 
151 In psychology, denial is generally defined as “an unconscious defense mechanism used to reduce 
anxiety by denying thoughts, feelings, or facts that are consciously intolerable” (2007). 
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constructivism have conflated it with liberal idealism, filtering out all but the constrained, 
optimistic worldview from constructivism’s relatively open temporality.152 
 In relation to classical realism, temporal disciplining involves multiple moves. 
First, classical realism’s nuanced understanding of power is hewn down to pure material 
capabilities (Waltz 1986c). Then, its concern with setting limits on what constitutes the 
political is read not as a preventive response to political abuses, but as a constriction of all 
politics to the exercise of material power by the strong against the weak.153 Finally, 
nuance and ethics having been disposed of, classical realism is conflated with neorealism’s 
ahistorical cycle and treated exclusively as an argument meant to legitimize eternal 
(permutational) violence between states (Walker 1991:459, 1993:63). In Baertian terms, 
these moves shift classical realism from the relatively open historical type to the 
ahistorical type, necessitating recent efforts to recover the ethical concerns of the 
movement’s origins (however conceived).154 
 
                                                 
152 This conflation may be due in part to the confusion of constructivism’s cognitive evolution with 
the linear-progressive evolution favored by Modelski. Such confusion bolsters the liberal idealist 
charge by ignoring the critical potential of constructivism’s politicization of norm emergence. 
153 This move is epitomized in the common, presentist reference to Thucydides' ostensibly ‘realist’ 
observation that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they 
have to accept” (2002 V.89). For example, Gilpin contends that “there have been three great realist 
writers; it is difficult . . . to conceive that anyone would deny them inclusion in the tradition. They 
are Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Carr”. In the same passage, Gilpin criticizes Ashley for holding 
“an amazingly narrow and time-bound conception of the realist tradition” (1986:306 emphasis 
added).  For a discussion of Thucydides as a political theorist, see (Brown, et al. 2002:20). 
154 Such efforts include, but are in no way limited to (Lang 2001, Lebow 2003, Williams 2005b, 
discussed as ‘reflexive’ recoveries in Steele 2007b). 
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Figure 2: Schizophrenia in IR theory 
 
 
Conclusion: a metaphorical response 
 The disciplining of constructivism and classical realism via theoretical 
vulgarizations levers both movements into the dominant dichotomized framework that 
demands a choice between cyclical or linear-progressive temporality. In this way, 
responses to constructivism and classical realism deny those movement’s novelty, and are 
a form of Baert’s maintenance-based second order self-reflection—maintenance by denial. 
His third temporal type—the relatively open historical world view—offers a rejoinder to 
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intradisciplinary maintenance by providing a more effective metaphorical image with 
which to understand continuity and change as mutually inclusive features of IR theory 
rather than as symptoms of theoretical schizophrenia. 
 Recalling Baert’s argument that effective theorizing makes use of synchrony and 
continuity as well as diachrony and change, the appropriate metaphorical treatment of 
time is not as an either-cycle-or-arrow choice, but might instead be as the image of the 
wheel (Zerubavel 1985:84).155 The wheel captures aspects of both cyclicality and linear 
development. But rather than eternal return, the wheel derives motive force from the 
many permutations that ensure that no two circumvolutions are exactly the same. And 
instead of a closed historical conception that predetermines the destination of linear 
movement, the wheel’s course is constantly affected by the ground over which it rolls, 
thus incorporating novelty. In these ways, the motion of the wheel manifests habitual 
elements that can be studied to uncover implicit structurating principles, while also 
ensuring that we always move somewhere from here and somewhen from now (see figure 
three below). 
 
                                                 
155 Zerubavel conceives the wheel as the more accurate description of calendrical images: “locating 
an instant within ‘1981’ along the arrow of historical time does not prevent us from also 
designating is as ‘11:19 A.M., Thursday, November 26,’ and thus locating it within four different 
wheels (the daily, weekly, monthly, and annual cycles) that roll along that historical road” 
(1985:84). My use of the metaphor is more concerned with an adequate, general accommodation of 
continuity and change in social life. 
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Figure 3: The wheel of time 
 
 
 As is likely obvious, time’s wheel is essentially a metaphorical image of the 
constructivist approach that views the relationship between agents and structure as 
intersubjective and co-constitutive (Baert 1992b:70). Since explicating a theory using a 
metaphor inspired by it would risk tautology, I will instead suggest how the wheel can 
understand classical realism. In this briefest of sketches, the ground along which the 
wheel rolls is historical contingency—the various (patterns of) circumstances that 
constitute social reality uniquely in each moment. Political behavior constitutes the 
circumvolutions, since classical realism understands politics as being habitually concerned 
with the pursuit of interests. Politics among nations, and more importantly what 
constitutes ‘the political’, can be understood as determining the diameter of the wheel. 
This is a crucial feature because diameter greatly affects momentum, constituted of speed 
and mass, which is related to the ground of historical contingency in two ways. First, 
greater ground speed corresponds to greater sensitivity on the part of the wheel to major 
features of that ground, which may induce dramatic changes of course. Second, greater 
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mass has the effect of flattening, ‘ironing out’, or homogenizing the ground of 
international politics. Thus, Morgenthau’s realism may be understood as criticizing 
failures to constrain overly liberal156 understandings of the political. In the instance of 
Weimar Germany, the result of such failure was the irreversible political momentum of 
Nazism which could only be halted by a resort to brute force. The implication now is not 
that violence is a political necessity, but that violence has no place in politics. When 
political wheels of time are imprudently constructed, violence provides the fatal indicator 
that they have careened out of control. 
 To traditionalists and skeptics, metaphorical counterproposals may seem little 
more than literary sport using international politics as its playing field. However, “within 
the academy there is little incentive to take international temporal plurality seriously, 
and . . .  even if we wanted to do so, we lack a philosophical vocabulary adequate to the 
challenge” (Hutchings 2007:83). The extant temporal metaphorical dichotomy is 
pervasive, giving it an aura of power which masks its inadequacy. Any attempt to 
construct an adequate vocabulary of temporality must improve on this convention, and 
the image of the wheel is provided as one example. Such ongoing attempts should not 
proceed smoothly—if IR diagnoses real (open) temporality as a schizophrenic condition, 
then the project of a truly temporal vocabulary in IR will disrupt most theoretical 
traditions and confirm Baert’s observation that temporalized theorizing makes 
                                                 
156 “Liberal” here means overly inclusive in the sense that too many elements of social life were 
viewed as eligible for political contestation; it is not meant to implicate any liberal political 
movement. 
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“iconoclasts” of us all (1992b:145). Disruption need not be an intrinsic objective, but if 
iconic metaphors are no more than bankrupt vaults within which all theoretical diversity 
is imprisoned, then iconoclasm is a necessary part of the process of understanding 
variegated temporality. In the final chapter, I discuss what might constitute the next step 





When-to from now? 
 
 
The distinction between past, present, and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion. 




 The central thrust of this thesis has been that thinking about time and 
temporality contributes to a richer understanding of international politics. In prior 
chapters, the argument proceeded along two main paths. First, I demonstrated that 
canonical IR theoretical movements can be usefully typologized by their (mostly) implicit 
temporal attitudes. Temporalized analysis exposes a theory’s approach to surprises and 
incongruities—both unavoidable features of social life. Furthermore, analyzing 
movements based on their image of the future highlights important assumptions and 
bargains that are constitutive of every theoretical edifice. Ahistorical theories such as 
neorealism and structural Marxism depict purely spatialized international relations, 
substituting a ‘snapshot’ view for a moving image. Closed historical theories like 
democratic peace theory and Wendtian constructivism accommodate only one dynamic 
view of the world, in which international relations are moving inexorably along a highly 
constrained path toward a predetermined end point. 
 124
 Whereas ahistorical and closed historical movements marginalize surprises and 
future possibilities, relatively open historical theories incorporate such features within 
their theoretical image of the world. Classical realism, misunderstood as a rationale for 
repetitive violence, is actually an attempt to delimit the focus of political contestation as a 
prudential measure against the vagaries of temporal contingency.157 Accepting an inability 
to ‘see’ the future, classical realists endeavor to paint a picture of the political world using 
as little violence as is possible. Constructivism embraces indeterminacy and possibility in 
a more methodological manner by proposing a co-constitutive loop between agents and 
structures. As actions and their consequences play out in time, interests, identities, and 
habituated interactions change, and in turn change social actors. 
 In addition to analyzing major theoretical movements, I likewise appraised two 
recent trends that were premised on a greater accommodation of complexity and change 
in international politics. From a temporalized standpoint, both trends emphasize rather 
than escape the traditional limitations of IR theory. Postinternationalism, for all its 
attention to non-state actors and new dynamic processes, fails to imagine an exit from 
“fragmegrative” cycles and thus offers only an updated but still Whiggish snapshot of the 
social world. Accelerationism, based on a well-founded concern with the relationship 
between technological innovation and society, becomes entrenched in a singular vision of 
the degradational affects of those innovations, privileging the increased velocity of social 
                                                 
157 Morgenthau’s vision of political science is based in part on avoiding “the neglect of the 
contingencies inherent in political prediction” (1993 [1948]:21). 
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life over the steering potential of all social actors. This restricts the accelerationist 
imagination of possible futures to purely negative endpoints. Both emerging movements 
persist in choosing between a cyclical or linear progressive view of time, reproducing the 
Enlightenment dichotomy as well as the conditions of temporal schizophrenia that have 
plagued IR since its inception. As an antidote to such theoretical dissonance, I proposed 
the metaphor of a wheel as a more useful image of time in IR. The wheel insists on some 
amount of change in every repetition while retaining an indeterminate view of the path 
along which changes proceed. 
 As an empirical complement to these theoretical critiques, the second line of 
investigation offered a genealogical history of modern time and sovereignty. By 
demonstrating that many of the spaces or ‘sites’ where modern sovereignty developed also 
contained the roots of modern, Western, standardized time, I argued that the current 
international system has been constituted by both spatial and temporal organizing 
principles. Sovereignty, much en vogue in post-Cold War IR, represents a spatial ordering 
principle of the modern political world, and time is its counterpart. Because it has 
received significantly less critical attention than sovereignty and has thus become more 
naturalized or taken for granted, Western standard time in many ways is a hegemonic 
organizing principle of the international realm. 
 This project is conceived as an initial effort in a potentially long research program. 
If time is as neglected by IR as I have contended, future research topics should abound. 
By way of conclusion, I propose in this chapter the first step of a research agenda 
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intended to facilitate both a greater understanding of time in IR and a better 
comprehension of time by IR. Implied in foreign policy analysis and adumbrated by a few 
critical theorists, this initial step challenges the influence of positivism in IR by 
interrogating the epistemological (and by implication the ontological) status of the 
present in order to move toward an understanding of time as a ‘flow’ of processes rather 
than as a march of abstract, discrete units. In addition to its critical intent, this step also 
represents an interdisciplinary move in that it provides IR with an entry point to a 
substantial body of thought on the philosophy of time. By departing the present, IR can 
make better use of the diverse intellectual world in which it is theoretically situated. 
 
Foreign Policy Analysis and subjectivism 
 Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is unique within IR for its explicit and systematic 
treatment of time. Additionally, in its focus on the subjective experiences of foreign 
policy elites during times of crisis, FPA offers a directive to IR theory in general and 
specifically to inquiries about time. Reintroducing social subjectivity to the core of 
analysis is an important step toward incorporating time into IR in a pluralistic manner. 
 While FPA is topically rich, I am currently concerned solely with the treatment 
of temporal factors in foreign policy crises, a longstanding interest in FPA158 of which 
                                                 
158 Explaining his seminal research during the height of the Cold War, Hermann observed that, 
despite the relative stability of that period compared to the decades of World Wars, foreign policy 
crises remained frequent enough that they “not only permit but also warrant investigation” 
(1963:63).  
 127
time has been a foundational factor. Charles Hermann posits three dimensions of foreign 
policy crises: an external threat to “high priority values” or organizations, an element of 
surprise, and a restricted amount of time in which to respond to the situation (1963:64).159 
Simulations of crisis situations devote significant effort to replicating their temporal 
dimensions, including mechanisms meant to “further the sense that the initial [crisis] 
periods [are] to be embedded in a series of longer time units” (Hermann and Hermann 
1967:403) as well as variations in the time permitted to respond to new diplomatic 
messages during the crisis (Hermann 1972b:192).160 The notion of crisis has undergone 
repeated modifications, but these typically concern the importance or specificity of the 
first two dimensions suggested by Hermann. Some sense of “time pressure” on decision 
makers has remained an enduring and central feature (see the discussion in Stern 
2003:186-87). 
 Related research on conflict negotiation operationalizes time as an imposed limit 
on diplomatic encounters (Bartos 1964, Komorita and Barnes 1969, Alcock 1974, 
Brookmire and Sistrunk 1980). Strategic choice models of both crises and negotiations 
suggest that time-pressure, by reducing information exchange, aspirations, and flexibility, 
is a boundary condition on rationality (Pruitt and Johnson 1970, Carnevale and Lawler 
                                                 
159 Hermann notes similar crisis dimensions in (Hamblin 1958, Milburn 1961, Robinson 1962). 
160 These projects, focused on simulating the outbreak of World War I, included messenger role-
players (Hermann 1972a, Hermann and Hermann 1967), but would have benefited from Kern’s 
subsequent explication of the varied temporal dissonance effected by new communications 
technology on diplomats during the July Crisis (see chapter two). By showing how shocking the 
new experiences of telegraph and telephone usage were to some, Kern also indicates a difficulty in 
comprehensively simulating temporal dissonance after populations have been widely exposed to 
such technologies. 
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1986). Furthermore, time-pressure often overwhelms methodical intelligence analysis, 
heightens ambiguity, and encourages a bias toward intuitions and pre-conceptions, 
making surprises and failures “inevitable”161 in foreign policy decision making (Betts 
1978:68,70). 
 Recent FPA has diversified its consideration of time to include contemporary 
media coverage of crises, a factor thought to increase time-pressure on elites to make 
“snap decisions” while reducing the influence of traditional diplomacy (Gilboa 2003:99-
101). Echoing Kern’s discussion of the July crisis, slow responses to events are often 
characterized by the media as “indecisive” or as evidence that an administration has been 
caught by “surprise” (Gilboa 2003:100).162 Finally, some research on decision making and 
crises relies on diachrony to access the “sequential” importance (Ozkececi-Taner 
2006:547) of the numerous “occasions for decision” (Beasley, et al. 2001) that actually 
constitute what scholarship later describes as a single “crisis”. Sequential analysis allows a 
more nuanced conceptualization of the innards of crises, as in the observation that elites 
                                                 
161 As suggested by their association with failures, the inevitable surprises that Betts concludes 
should not be seen as related too closely to Baert’s novelty, since the FPA literature treats them as 
symptomatic of abnormal situations beset by constrained rationality and/or inadequate intelligence 
rather than as constitutive of reality. 
162 A particularly striking example of the affect of real-time media coverage is Gilboa’s contention 
that President Kennedy had approximately 624 times longer to respond to the Cuban missile crisis 
than President Clinton would have been afforded had a similar dilemma arisen three decades later 
(Gilboa 2003: 100). 
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initially tend to prefer “shortcuts” before later turning to “limited value maximization” 
(James and Zhang 2005).163 
 In addition to being more fecund than in IR theory, time in FPA draws attention 
to the importance of social subjectivity in international politics. Research on crises and 
decision making treats time as an intrinsically diverse factor experienced by individual 
humans rather than as a fixed social object or behavioral context. The very idea of crisis 
depends on the experience of duration, and a “subjective notion of crisis makes it 
impossible to neatly demarcate a beginning and an end to these events because different 
actors perceive they are in a crisis at different points in time” (Boin 2004:167). The focus 
in FPA on subjective time also crucially distinguishes between examining the effects of 
time (e.g. on sequential policy making processes) and the analysis of events or processes 
that simply take place in time. In the latter, time exists strictly as an analytical context. In 
the former, time affects the social (inter)actions of individuals, each of whom have a 
unique time consciousness. Time means different things to different people, a simple 
enough observation whose potential and importance has hitherto been tapped only by the 
focus on social subjectivity found in FPA. Investigations into the plurality of subjectively 
experienced times can make at least two contributions to IR theory. First, they can 
                                                 
163 Another related concept is the effect of time on belief. While not directed exclusively at crises, 
work such as that of Haven (1956), Gergen and Back (1965), and Campbell (2003) points out that 
individual interests, preferences, and beliefs are not fixed or static but instead change as time 
passes—a constitutive element of constructivism. 
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introduce an element of heterotemporality164 to a discipline dominated by modern 
temporality and Western standard time (Hutchings 2007:82-89). Second, they can provide 
empirical referents to theoretical problematizations of the objective reality of the ‘present’, 
the topic I turn to now. 
 
Post-presentism, post-positivism 
 FPA compels a concern with subjective experience that can be amplified by 
turning to critical theory concerned with the self, memory, and trauma. While FPA and 
critical theory may have few obvious overlaps, connecting them facilitates a subjectified 
understanding of temporality that moves well beyond standardized time. This link in turn 
allows a stronger relationship between IR, temporalized social theory, and philosophical 
investigations of time, and thus the potential for a robust interdisciplinary dialogue.165 
 In the context of memory and trauma, Jenny Edkins examines the political 
contest between the sovereign state and survivors of war over meaning and 
commemoration. Briefly put, continually confronted by contingency and uncertainty, 
sovereign states rely on a narrative of historicity and heroism to cleanse the violent 
methods by which they reproduce themselves as principal political actors (Edkins 2003:1-
                                                 
164 Drawing from the thought of Deleuze and Chakrabarty, Hutchings describes heterotemporality 
as a plurality of temporalities and argues that it “is an irreducible feature of history” (2007:85). 
165 Social theories of time and/or philosophies of time have already received substantial treatment 
in numerous other academic disciplines including political theory (Lane 2000), anthropology 
(Fabian 1983, Turner and Falgout 2002), geology (Gould 1987), physics (Price 1996) and quantum 
studies (Hameroff and Penrose 1996). 
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19).166 Homogenous time is a crucial part of this maintenance: “In the linear time of the 
standard political processes, which is the time associated with the continuance of the 
nation-state, events that happen are part of a well known and widely accepted story” 
(Edkins 2003:xiv). All state actions, especially those that produce citizen casualties, must 
be positioned within such narratives. Trauma and memory are important sources of 
dissent because they “disrupt” such linear accounts, demanding the invention of “a new 
account, one that will produce a place for what has happened and make it meaningful” 
(Edkins 2003:xiv). Trauma, as a “betrayal of trust” by “the very powers that we are 
convinced will protect us and give us security”, involves events that are outside the 
bounds of language, which itself is socially constituted by relations of power (Edkins 
2003:7). Acts and subsequent recollections that are literally ‘unspeakable’ are what 
constitute trauma, so trauma inherently resists narrativization. Thus, when they attempt 
to incorporate it into dominant, heroic narratives, states automatically “gentrify” trauma 
by using conventional language to describe it (Edkins 2003:15). 
 Edkins proposes that a more just approach to trauma “is ‘to encircle again and 
again the site’ of the trauma” so as to mark its perpetration without “re-inscripting” its 
memory (2003:15). This circular solution responds predictably to her understanding of 
state political time as linear by looking to the other pole of the Enlightenment dichotomy 
                                                 
166 In his examination of national humiliation days, Callahan (2006) provides an interesting 
complement to Edkins’ approach, arguing that state power results from the mobilization of 
national shame instead of heroism, and that the state controls citizens through calendrical 
coordination. 
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for an alternative.167 However, in the process of critiquing that linearity, Edkins pits the 
individual subject as the preserver of memory against the state social structure that 
attempts to erase uncertainty and novelty—social reality itself, suggesting a view of social 
action and memory highly amenable to temporalized social theory. 
 This psychoanalytic account of the subject further exposes linear temporality as a 
purely mental construct that the mind employs to bring order to the complexity of lived 
experience. “A certain non-linearity is evident: time no longer moves unproblematically 
from past through present to future. In a sense, subjects only retrospectively become what 
they already are . . . . [T]he social order too shares this retroactive constitution” (Edkins 
2003:13). Interaction is crucial because it is only when the actor receives responses to her 
actions (including speech) that she recognizes her own subjectivity. “This recognition is 
belated when viewed through the lens of a linear temporality: it is not at the moment we 
decide to speak that we see who we are, but only a moment later, when we get a 
response” (Edkins 2003:13).168 This view of subjectivity and social order posits that both 
are “in a continual process of becoming” (Edkins 2003:13), and differs from that of FPA, 
                                                 
167 Edkins’ approach may also contain a response to the metaphor of time as a wheel proposed 
earlier. As she observes, “Trauma time is inherent in and destabilizes any production of linearity. 
Trauma has to be excluded for linearity to be convincing . . . similarly, trauma time cannot be 
described in the language we have without recourse to notions of linearity” (Edkins 2003:16). This 
suggests that trauma may yet problematize all temporal metaphors that include linear or cyclical 
elements. 
168 Edkins’ account of subjectivity and linear temporality relies on some self-Other relationship. A 
recent account of ontological security in IR poses an alternative source of subjectivity, located 
within the Self. In this account, subjective “possibilities arise not just in the dialectic between the 
self and other, but within the internal dialectic that arises from the ontological security-seeking 
process” (Steele 2007c:32). This raises the question of whether temporality is created within as well 
as between individuals, a possibility that bolsters arguments for the subjective study of time. 
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which situates the social subject in some present now, however experienced. Edkins’ 
subjects exist without such a present, always looking a little into the past to see who they 
were becoming, and always dependent on future interactions to tell them retrospectively 
who they currently are.  
 Edkins’ subjectivity is quite similar to Baert’s temporal foundation, which posits 
that every act requires an “I”, but that that “I” can only be appraised as “me” by an 
immediately subsequent “I” (1992b:121).169 Part of Baert’s aim is to deny an “objectivist” 
or “asymmetrical” view of time which assumes that “the real past has occurred in a 
particular way and . . . nothing in the present or future can change that” (1992b:76). Baert 
grants that the past unfolded in a particular way, but insists that the meaning or 
representation of that past “can change, and it does so regularly”, both subconsciously and 
intentionally (1992b:76).170 A further objective of such pragmatic, process oriented 
theorizing is to deny the philosophical and ontological dominance of the present, which 
relegates past and future to its temporal horizons and thus diminishes their importance 
and reliability (Baert 1992b:76). Giddens’ account of time likewise diminishes the present 
as little more than an affect of the temporal ordering accomplished by memory and 
                                                 
169 Edkins’ and Baert’s accounts of the subject, as well as the constructed nature of the present, 
were foreshadowed in Niebuhr’s classical realism. Discussing human creative potential, Niebuhr 
claims that “Man’s freedom to transcend the natural flux gives him the possibility of grasping a 
span of time in his consciousness and thereby of knowing history. It also enables him to change, 
reorder and transmute the causal sequences of nature and thereby to make history” (Niebuhr 1943, 
quoted in Steele 2007c:46). Morgenthau makes a similar point: “That which reveals itself as a 
simple truth in retrospect was either completely unknown in prospect or else could not be 
determined by anything but an uncertain hunch” (1993 [1948]:21). 
170 Such alterations are the cornerstones of Baert’s first- and second-order self reflection (1992b:86). 
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perception that inhabit both past and future in a continuous, processual flow. Far from 
subordinating the past and future, the Giddensian present cannot be constructed without 
them (Giddens 1984:49). Similarly, the self is not an “I” acting in the present now; it is the 
sum of forms of recall that the social agent uses to characterize the origins of its actions 
(Giddens 1984:51). Thus, memory, perception, and social subjectivity extend fore and aft 
of the superficial present, granting a kind of symmetry to time. 
 Temporal symmetry relates inversely to the epistemological and ontological status 
of the present, and this relationship holds crucial implications for IR as a social science. 
Positivist philosophy of social science has exerted a strong influence on IR (especially the 
American variety) for several decades (Smith 1996:16), and is most often diagnosed by the 
desire for Deductive-Nomological, or ‘covering law’ explanations (Wight 2006:21). I argue 
that positivist IR is founded on an assumption of the primacy of the present. Steve Smith 
defines positivism in part by a belief “that it is empirical validation or falsification that is 
the hallmark of ‘real’ inquiry” (1996:16). In his response to Smith, Wight places 
empiricism within “Phenomenalism: the doctrine that holds that we cannot get beyond 
the way things appear to us . . . appearances, not realities, are the only objects of 
knowledge” (2006:21). Both empiricism and phenomenalism imply that the present is 
more reliable than the (recollected) past or the (imagined) future. Only what we can see 
before us can be reliably ascertained, granting epistemological privilege to the present.171  
                                                 
171 Dovetailing with this privilege is the positivist explanation of unanticipated consequences as 
modeling failures that require “ironing out” in theory (Baert 1992b:69). 
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 Memory research outside of IR has linked these loyalties to the Western tendency 
to “objectify time; to view time as an aspect of the world as it exists rather than as an 
aspect of the way Western minds experience that world” (Turner and Falgout 2002:102). 
Phenomenalism, while skeptical of reliable knowledge by virtue of its reliance on 
‘perception’, marginalizes imagination and memory even further because of that very 
reliance, which binds people “in what really is, the present” (Turner and Falgout 
2002:103). If we can only know what we see before us now, then what has come before 
and what may be are merely “derivative” of present perception (Turner and Falgout 
2002:103).172 The egalitarian stance of symmetrical time with regards to past and future 
thus problematizes positivism’s underpinning in the present and places it back within the 
historical context of Western modernity. Critical investigations into subjectivity, self, and 
memory have consistently sought to challenge the Western modern state’s permanence. 
By exposing the illusory nature of the present, critical theory can also emancipate the past 
and future from the margins of IR, giving time in IR a more egalitarian character while 
further expanding the discipline beyond the presentist horizon of positivist social science. 
 
Situating IR in time, philosophy, and social theory 
 Critical IR theory opposes positivist understandings of the ‘verifying’ role and 
exclusively empirical conduct of social science. At the root of this dissent is a 
                                                 
172 Turner and Falgout also locate the roots of quantified understandings and spatialized metaphors 
of time in this Western privileging of the present (2002:103). 
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philosophical debate about the ontological and epistemological aspects of time. By 
acknowledging the temporal foundations of a significant portion of its intradisciplinary 
dialogue, IR gains access to substantial scholarship on the sociology and philosophy of 
time. For instance, concurrent with the emergence of IR as a discipline, philosophers of 
time were discussing whether time could be conceived of as tripartite (past, present, and 
future, known as Type A) or only as the past moving into the future (known as Type B, 
McTaggart 1908:458).173 Exploring this dialogue may further explicate debates over 
positivism within IR, as well as illuminate new considerations in the philosophy of social 
science. But MacTaggart’s typology is but a single gear in the clockwork muse174 of 
philosophies of time. Martin Heidegger’s influence on international politics is usually 
epitomized by his relationship to the Nazi party, but perhaps IR will also find useful his 
effort to counter the objectivist present with a hypothesis of “presencing” which involves 
encountering “something that is already a ‘being’ ” (1996 [1953]:85).175 IR might also make 
use of Einstein’s relative reply to abstract, Newtonian time (2001); the contemporary 
                                                 
173 McTaggart actually divides Type A time into five parts made up of “a series of positions running 
from the far past through the near past to the present, and then from the present to the near future 
and the far future”. Type B time he describes as “The series of positions which runs from earlier to 
later” (McTaggart 1908:458). 
174 Ironically, this phrase comes from the title of Zerubavel’s guide to completing theses and 
dissertations (1999). 
175 Heidegger’s presencing is not necessarily related to “co-presencing”, defined as “intersubjective” 
or shared time (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004:90). 
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views of time employed in physics (Price 1996); or the more radical propositions of 
quantum studies (Hameroff and Penrose 1996).176 
 Philosophies of time overlap with social theories of time, just a few of which have 
been discussed in this project. For instance, IR might turn to Max Weber, whose theory 
of traditional (cyclical), modern (rational), and charismatic / transcendent time offers an 
innovative exploratory framework. The usefulness of Weber’s temporality has already 
been exemplified in Hanson’s fascinating account of the influence of an amalgamated 
rational-charismatic temporal conceptualization on the design of Soviet institutions 
(1997). Adam’s sophisticated temporal framework, discussed briefly in the first chapter, 
may also hold great potential for postcolonial studies of international politics focused on 
the temporal Othering of marginalized cultures (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004). 
 Within IR, even the standard Enlightenment binary can serve dissident efforts, as 
Kimberly Hutchings recently demonstrates in a temporalized critique of critical theory 
(2007).177 In a more empirical vein, all of the sites discussed in chapter two deserve closer 
examination in order to determine whether and how much the relationship between time 
and sovereignty exceeds historical correlations. As I have argued throughout, more 
discussion, dialogue, and debate about time within IR will increase the richness of our 
image of the international political realm. Finally, by building on the subjectivity of FPA; 
                                                 
176 Wendt has already begun down this path (2006), although it remains to be seen how (and how 
much) time will feature in his account. 
177 Hutchings’ critique is based on the contention that “a particular relationship between clock and 
calendar time” characterizes critical IR theory, producing studies of international politics from the 
“perspective of a singular, progressive temporality” (2007:72). 
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notions of self, memory, and trauma from critical theory; and a broader reappraisal of 
positivism and the privileged present, IR can both enrich itself and enjoy a more robust 
interdisciplinary exchange by exposing the international political dimensions of time as 
we now know and live it. 
 This project began with the observation that IR has had little space for time. In 
this initial running together of two social dimensions, I hinted at both the imbalanced 
diet of IR theory and the impending metaphorical discussions that are ubiquitous in 
studies about time. If Edkins is right that all language has a lineage in relations of power, 
then predominantly spatialized metaphors of time suggest that it is not only IR that fails 
to fully accommodate the topic. The language we possess to discuss time indicates the 
dominance of space in ways of knowing, seeing, and speaking about social life. Time is an 
arrow, a line, a cycle; it expands and contracts; moves forward or backward; marks the 
motion of cosmic masses through astronomical voids.  
 By contrast, I can think of no temporalized metaphors that stand in for statements 
about space. Perhaps the emergence of such terms will mark the fait accompli of time’s 
escape from space. On the other hand, dynamic understandings of emancipation focus on 
“process utopias” rather than fixed end points (Booth 1999:44), a view from within 
somewhen focused on small, ‘tactical’ objectives more consistent with the contingent and 
assuredly kinetic nature of the wheel. If we are ever to meet St. Augustine’s challenge to 
both ‘know’ and ‘describe’ time, then the discovery of uniquely temporal terms must 
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